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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CLIMATE 
DAMAGES LITIGATION 
Michael Byers*, Kelsey Franks & Andrew Gage 
ABSTRACT: The annual global costs of climate change in 2010 were 
estimated at nearly $700 billion. As the costs continue to escalate, discussion is 
necessarily shifting to who should pay for mitigation and adaption. Many 
scholars argue that policy considerations and principles of tort law support 
holding greenhouse gas producers responsible for the costs of climate change. 
However, legal claims against greenhouse gas producers in the United States 
have thus far proven unsuccessful. This Article explores two previously 
overlooked potentialities that could significantly and rapidly alter the landscape 
for climate change litigation: (1) the emergence of transnational climate change 
litigation coupled with the possible enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. 
courts; and (2) the enactment of legislation altering the rules around climate 
change liability. This Article then quantifies the contribution of major U.S. fossil 
fuel companies to the costs and damages of climate change to illustrate the 
potential financial impacts of successful litigation or legislative change. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a speech given on September 29, 2015 at Lloyd’s of 
London, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney described 
climate change as a “Tragedy of the Horizon” that is bound to 
become a “defining issue for [global] financial stability.”1 He 
described broad channels through which climate change will 
impact financial stability in the coming decades, two of which 
are worth repeating in full: 
First, physical risks: the impacts today on insurance 
liabilities and the value of financial assets that arise 
from climate—and weather-related events, such as 
floods and storms that damage property or disrupt 
trade; 
                                               
1. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, Speech Given at Lloyd’s of 
London: Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon—Climate Change and Financial 
Stability at 4 (Sept. 29, 2015), 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech844.pdf. 
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Second, liability risks: the impacts that could arise 
tomorrow if parties who have suffered loss or damage 
from the effects of climate change seek compensation 
from those they hold responsible. Such claims could 
come decades in the future, but have the potential to hit 
carbon extractors and emitters—and, if they have 
liability cover, their insurers—the hardest.2 
The physical risks of climate change are well understood.3 In 
2010, the global costs of climate change, including private and 
public property damage, were estimated at nearly $700 billion. 
That number is projected to rise dramatically in the coming 
years.4 The United States incurred an estimated $45 billion of 
that nearly $700 billion,5 and is expected to incur hundreds of 
billions more in climate change-related damages by the end of 
the century.6 
With over 95 percent of peer-reviewed scientific papers that 
take a position on anthropogenic global warming endorsing the 
view that human activity is causing climate change,7 the 
                                               
2. Id. at 5–6. 
3. Numerous articles, reports, and studies have summarized the harm to people, 
property, and the natural environment caused by climate change. See, e.g., CLIMATE 
VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR: A GUIDE TO THE 
COLD CALCULUS OF A HOT PLANET (2d ed. 2012); Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: 
The Ultimate Public Nuisance, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 107, 113–19 (Clifford Rechtschaffen ed., 2007); Gary 
C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions 
Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 268 (2004) (explaining that the consequences of 
global warming include heat waves, droughts, storms, harm to biodiversity and 
agriculture, stimulation of infectious diseases, and rises in sea levels). 
4. See CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 17. 
5. See id. at 48. 
6. See id. (estimating the cost of climate change-related damage in the United States 
will exceed $100 billion annually by 2030); Michael Greenstone, Paying the Cost of 
Climate Change, BROOKINGS (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/09/19-paying-cost-of-climate-
change-greenstone (citing http://riskybusiness.org/report/national). 
7. See John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global 
Warming in the Scientific Literature, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 8 (May 15, 2013), 
http://stacks.iop.org/ERL/8/. The most respected of these peer-reviewed scientific 
papers are the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, produced and 
reviewed by thousands of scientists from the UN’s 195 member states. See 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2014) (“[a]nthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and 
population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented 
in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other 
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discussion is shifting to the second channel identified by 
Carney and the focus of this Article: the liability risks 
presented by climate litigation. The question of who should pay 
for the costs and damages of climate change will only become 
more salient as public awareness of the costs increase, and the 
science connecting greenhouse gases with specific climate 
events improves.8 
Some scholars have argued that policy considerations and 
the principles of tort law support holding greenhouse gas 
producers responsible for the costs of climate change.9 In the 
                                               
anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are 
extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the 
mid-20th century.”). According to a study conducted in 2004, of 928 article abstracts 
listed in the Institute of Scientific Information database, 75 percent of the papers 
either explicitly or implicitly accepted the consensus view of the IPCC Reports, and 25 
percent took no position on the current anthropogenic climate change. Notably, none of 
the papers opposed the consensus view. See Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: 
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686 (2004). 
8. Recent efforts to use legal channels to hold fossil fuel companies accountable for 
climate costs have included public campaigns. See, e.g., Climate Suit against RWE: 
Peruvian Mountain Guide Will Appeal, GERMANWATCH (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://germanwatch.org/en/13438 (demonstrating their support for Peruvian farmer 
Saul Luciano Lliuya in litigation against the German coal company, RWE, with 
extensive media and other public outreach). See also WEST COAST ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, CLIMATE LAW IN OUR HANDS, http://www.climatelawinourhands.org (note that 
author Andrew Gage is involved in this campaign); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to 
Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE 1, 4 (2007) (“[W]e should start 
thinking about cost allocation now because very soon the world is going to start doing 
so. As the realization sinks in that climate change will cause billions of dollars of harm 
even if we do everything feasible to cut back on emissions, the people who are directly 
harmed are going to start wondering whether they alone should bear the costs.”). 
9. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8 at 29–33 (“In addition to just deserts, ‘Emitters Pay’ 
could serve other social goals. As discussed earlier, the prospect of financial 
responsibility could serve as a valuable incentive for reducing emissions. . . . Finally, 
emitters may be in a good position to spread costs to shareholders or consumers, thus 
serving the loss-spreading function.”); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-
Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–5 
(2003); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance 
and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1861–63 (2008); Eduardo M. Penalver, 
Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 
38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 591 (1998) (“The cost-reducing goal of tort law indicates 
that courts should seek to hold liable those parties who are in the best position to 
make the price of products that lead to global climate change reflect their true cost 
(that is, to include the costs of accidents produced by global climate change within the 
prices of products whose manufacture and use contributes to the problem of climate 
change). The second, justice-based, goal of tort law indicates that the parties held 
liable should be those who have negligently failed to address the threat of climate 
change and who have taken actions to prevent other people from dealing appropriately 
with this threat. Given these goals, it is justifiable to hold liable the companies located 
at the earliest stages in the process of producing and marketing the fossil fuels 
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absence of a comprehensive international or domestic 
regulatory scheme, using litigation to recover such costs has 
become increasingly appealing. 
In the United States alone, over 500 cases have raised 
climate change issues in state and federal courts.10 However, 
only a handful of these cases have involved a plaintiff suing a 
non-governmental defendant for damages caused by climate 
change. These notably include Connecticut v. American Electric 
Company,11 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,12 and Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation.13 
While these ‘climate damages’ claims have been 
unsuccessful thus far,14 it is not unusual for new types of 
litigation to encounter problems as procedural obstacles are 
navigated and legal theories are tested.15 This has prompted 
numerous scholars to analyze the potential for climate 
damages litigation—most often at the domestic level and on 
the basis of current legal frameworks related to liability.16 
This Article discusses two previously overlooked 
potentialities that could change the climate damages litigation 
landscape significantly and rapidly: specifically, the emergence 
                                               
resulting in greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
10. See Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., ARNOLD & PORTER, 
http://www.climatecasechart.com (last visited June 24, 2016). 
11. Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), partially rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), partially rev’d, 564 U.S. 410, 415 
(2011). 
12. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D. 
Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), partially rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated and reh’g en 
banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
13. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 
2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
14. See, e.g., American Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. at 274, vacated, 582 F.3d 309 
(U.S. App. 2009), rev’d in part, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011); Comer, 2007 WL  at *1, rev’d 
in part, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 
(5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Native 
Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp., aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
15. See J. Randolph Evans et al., Past Prologue to Climate Change Liability, LAW360 
(May 31, 2011), 
http://www.dentons.com/en/~/media/d967a09488eb4fc69037f35c193007cd.ashx. 
  16. Evans, supra note 15; see, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory 
E. Wannier, United States of America, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW AND PRACTICE (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2012) (examining the potential for climate 
damages litigation in 18 countries). See also articles by Grossman, Zasloff, and 
Penalver, supra note 9. 
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of transnational climate damages litigation, including the 
possible enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. courts; and 
the enactment of legislation altering the rules around climate 
damages liability or “climate compensation acts.” These 
potentialities could occur individually or together. 
Section II of this Article provides an overview of the current 
state of climate damages litigation in the United States, 
drawing on jurisprudence and doctrine to outline the threshold 
issues currently facing potential domestic plaintiffs seeking to 
have their claim heard in U.S. courts. In addition, it describes 
the causation challenges that would likely emerge should a 
claim be considered on the merits.17 
Section III then introduces the first potentiality that could 
change the current climate damages litigation landscape 
significantly: the emergence of transnational litigation 
involving foreign plaintiffs bringing a claim against non-
government U.S. defendants—notably, U.S. greenhouse gas 
producers—in U.S. or foreign courts, and then seeking to have 
the resulting judgments enforced in countries where the 
defendants have assets.18 
The climate damages litigation landscape would also be 
significantly altered if countries enact legislation changing or 
clarifying the rules around climate damages liability. Section 
IV considers this possibility, drawing on the lessons learned 
from tobacco compensation acts to show how governments 
might be prompted to alter the rules around liability in 
response to new developments or situations of perceived 
unfairness.19 
Based on research quantifying the respective contribution of 
investor-owned greenhouse gas producers to carbon emissions, 
Section V calculates the respective contribution of major U.S. 
fossil fuel companies (as examples of major greenhouse gas 
producers) to the costs and damages of climate change. These 
calculations suggest the significant financial impact that the 
two previously identified potentialities could have if one or 
both become legal realities.20 
                                               
17. See infra Section II, “State of Climate Damages Litigation in the United States.” 
18. See infra Section III, “Transnational Climate Damages Litigation.” 
19. See infra Section IV, “Climate Compensation Legislation.” 
20. See infra Section V, “Quantifying the Liability Risk of U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Producers.” 
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II. STATE OF CLIMATE DAMAGES LITIGATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Broadly speaking, climate litigation refers to “any litigation 
motivated by a concern about climate change or climate change 
policy,” although narrower definitions are sometimes 
proposed.21 The term can encompass a wide range of litigation 
involving a variety of: actors, including governmental and non-
governmental plaintiffs and defendants; types of claims, 
including those based on statutory, common, and public 
international law; and purposes, including forcing, prohibiting, 
and recovering for governmental and non-governmental action 
or inaction on climate change.22 
This Article uses the expression ‘climate damages’ litigation 
to refer to a specific subset of climate litigation, namely, claims 
involving a plaintiff suing one or more non-governmental 
defendants for damages caused by climate change (such as 
those arising from a rise in sea level, and the exacerbation of 
climate events including hurricanes) and the costs of preparing 
for such impacts. The nature of this subset of climate litigation 
makes torts based on negligence, nuisance, and conspiracy well 
suited as potential bases for liability.23 
Academic articles on the prospects of climate damages 
litigation generally sit along a spectrum between two opposing 
positions. At one end of the spectrum, commentators who are 
optimistic about the prospects for climate damages litigation 
argue that climate damages are not fundamentally different 
from other types of common law damages that already give 
rise to liability,24 and that climate damages claims are very 
                                               
21. David Markell & J. B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the 
Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 26 (2012). The 
authors adopt a narrow definition for the purposes of their review: “any piece of 
federal, state, tribal, or local administrative or judicial litigation in which the party 
filings or tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an issue of fact or law 
regarding the substance or policy of climate change causes and impacts.” Id. at 27. 
22. See Markell, supra note 21, at 30–38 (discussing generally the major types of 
climate litigation); ARNOLD & PORTER, supra note 10 (a table of current U.S. climate 
litigation, maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and the law firm 
Arnold & Porter LLP). 
23. See ARNOLD & PORTER, supra note 10 (a table of current U.S. climate litigation, 
which includes the ‘principle law’ used and core object of cases). The climate damages 
claims filed to date in the United States have been centered on these bases for 
liability. 
24. Such articles discuss how torts of nuisance, negligence, and conspiracy could be 
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much in keeping with the purposes of tort law.25 
Many commentators sit mid-way along the spectrum. While 
they accept that existing legal concepts could form a basis to 
recover climate damages, they caution that such cases face a 
series of challenges often centered around causation—
specifically, which defendants can legitimately be said to have 
“caused” climate damages.26 Articles in this range of the 
spectrum typically accept the possibility of climate damages 
litigation, but vary on the likelihood of success.27 
At the other end of the spectrum, some commentators argue 
that climate damages claims face threshold issues that will 
likely prevent them from ever being argued on their merits.28 
In essence, these articles suggest that although climate change 
is affecting existing legal rights protected through tort law, 
climate damages claims raise issues that are too complicated 
                                               
applied to climate damages claims, and respond to the many defenses that are likely to 
be raised in such litigation. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9 at 60–61 (assessing the 
various tort principles that could provide a basis for claims against GHG producers, 
such as product liability and public nuisances, and concluding that “some tort-based 
climate change suits have strong legal merits and may be capable of succeeding”). 
25. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing how shifting the costs and 
damages of climate change onto fossil fuel producers is in line with the principle of 
corrective justice and equality); Zasloff, supra note 9 (discussing the various 
theoretical bases for tort litigation, and the policy reasons for targeting ‘upstream’ 
greenhouse gas producers); Penalver, supra note 9. 
26. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation 
Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COL. L. REV. 701, 703 (2008). 
27. See, e.g., David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of 
Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. ST. L. Rev. 1742, 1794 (2007) (arguing 
that changes in our understanding of climate change are increasingly the “foreseeable 
costs of GHG emissions,” thereby shifting the “relative risk-utility balance of climate 
changing activities,” thus increasing the likelihood a court will find that a GHG 
producers’ activities present an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury); Evans, supra 
note 15 at 3 (arguing that climate change litigation is likely to follow the same pattern 
as other historical mega-recoveries, where initially unsuccessful claims will transition 
into large, successful class-actions); Louis Charles Chambers, Tort Law, Climate 
Change and Private Nuisance at 17–21, (Oct. 2012) (unpublished LL.B. thesis, 
University of Otago), http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/journals/otago041734.pdf 
(arguing that a climate lawsuit against a hypothetical “super emitter,” responsible for 
all or substantially all emissions of greenhouse gases, would likely be successful under 
ordinary common law principles of liability, but concluding that the number of real-
world emitters involved creates potentially unmanageable challenges for would-be 
litigants in the absence of judicial innovations). 
28. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts: 
Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S. C. L. REV. 201, 224–25 (2010); 
Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 
(2011). 
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or political to be considered by the courts.29 
As this Section demonstrates, these latter predictions are 
premature as threshold and causation issues have yet to be 
navigated in the U.S. court system. While the challenges 
facing climate litigation are formidable, legal tools exist that 
could be used as a basis for finding U.S. greenhouse gas 
producers liable for climate change-related damages—given 
the right case, combination of parties, judge, and forum. 
A. Threshold Issues 
In the United States, a series of barriers—notably the 
political question doctrine, standing, pre-emption, and 
displacement—have thus far prevented any climate damages 
claim from being argued on its merits. However, as other 
scholars have pointed out, these separation-of-powers 
doctrines30 and their application in previous climate litigation 
have not barred future climate damages claims altogether.31 
1. Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine prevents U.S. courts from 
considering cases that raise policy decisions best addressed by 
the legislative or executive branch of the government.32 While 
attempts have been made to define what constitutes a ‘political 
question,’33 the doctrine remains shrouded in ambiguity.34 
                                               
29. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 28, at 224–25 (arguing “These are not the kinds of 
decisions that a common law court, without guidance from previously enacted 
statutory or regulatory standards, is capable of making. No appropriate judicial 
standard exists enabling a court to determine whether the contributions of any 
particular defendant emitter constitute the ‘unreasonable interference’ required by 
most definitions of public nuisance . . . . Such decisions are not usually suitable for 
adjudication . . . because of the numerous variables to be taken into account and the 
impossibility of developing generally applicable premises of reasoning with reference 
to which the variables can be judged.”) (internal citations omitted). 
30. See JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 
REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 270–71 (2015) (quoting a U.S. 
interviewee, the “separation-of-powers issue . . . comes up in different guises whether 
you call it a political question doctrine or displacement or standing . . . . It all comes 
down to the same issue of what branch or what government has what power.”). 
31. See id. at 274 (arguing “these doctrines have mostly acted to constrain certain 
types of petitioners and claims, rather than serving as a blanket barrier to climate 
litigation.”). 
32. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 590; PEEL, supra note 30, at 273. 
33. According to Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, there are six situations “that if 
 
9
Byers et al.: The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
2017] INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CLIMATE DAMAGES 273 
 
In the context of climate litigation, some lower courts in the 
United States have dismissed climate change-related claims on 
the basis that they present non-justiciable political questions.35 
However, higher courts, including the Supreme Court in 
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, have not accepted 
the political question doctrine as a bar to climate claims.36 
                                               
‘inextricable’ from the case, make dismissal on the basis of the political question 
doctrine appropriate.” See Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and 
the Political Question Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 79 (2008) (quoting Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)). Justice Brennan notes it is appropriate to avoid 
judicial resolution where there is “(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial 
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; (5) 
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 
(6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.” Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217) 
34. See Thorpe, supra note 33, at 81. 
35. See Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 406 F.2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y 
2005) (ruling that the third Baker factor, i.e. “the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion” applies to the 
case. Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for an injunction, ruling 
that it was impossible to “strike a balance ‘between interests seeking strict schemes to 
reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the 
economic concern’” without an “initial policy decision” by another branch of 
government); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at 
*1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing claims on basis of non-justiciability under the 
political question doctrine); Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that both the second and third Baker 
factors “[militate] in favor of dismissal.”). For criticisms of the application of the 
political question doctrine to these cases, see Thorpe, supra note 33, at 79. 
36. American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011) (“[t]he 
petitioners [A.E.P.] contend that the federal courts lack authority to adjudicate this 
case. Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article 
III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions; and further, that no other threshold obstacle 
bars review. Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in 
Massachusetts, or regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of 
the plaintiffs have Article III standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally divided 
Court, the Second Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”) 
(emphasis added) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–26 (2007)). This 
decision was reflected in the Court of Appeals judgment in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 
585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), which concluded that the political question doctrine does 
not apply. While the decision in Comer was later vacated due to an unusual procedural 
rule, no higher court has questioned the court’s reasoning in concluding that the 
political question doctrine does not apply in a climate damages case involving a private 
company as a defendant. In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the trial judgment, but based 
its decision on displacement, without discussing the political question doctrine. 663 F. 
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Some scholars have argued this ruling will likely limit the use 
of the political question doctrine in future U.S. cases.37 
2. Standing 
According to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff 
must have standing or locus standi to bring suit in a U.S. 
court.38 To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) 
injury-in-fact;39 (2) causation;40 and (3) redressability.41 While 
straightforward in appearance, this three-part requirement 
has been widely criticized for being “uncertain in application 
and unpredictable in result.”42 
                                               
Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
37. See, e.g., PEEL, supra note 30, at 273. Other scholars are slightly less optimistic, 
as the decision in Connecticut “did not set precedent in the technical sense,” but 
recognized that “it may give an indication of how the Supreme Court as presently 
constituted would rule in another case where states sued on public nuisance grounds 
about GHGs . . . .” See also Gerrard, supra note 16, at 584. 
38. Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not use the term “standing”, but rather 
requires that a claim involve a “case or controversy”. Courts have interpreted this as 
the “standing” requirement. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574 
(1992). 
39. See id. at 560 (the “injury-in-fact” must be (1) “concrete and particularized”; and 
(2) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”). 
40. See id. at 560–61 (the plaintiff must show “there [is] a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and not  . . . th[e] result [of] the independent 
action of some third party not before the court”). In general, the degree of inquiry into 
causation at the standing phase is less than the degree of inquiry into causation at the 
merit stage. Courts will generally find causation at the standing phase when the 
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct in cases involving toxic torts, or 
environmental cases, where the defendant’s conduct has made a “meaningful 
contribution” to the pollution. See Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from 
Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256, 2265 (2015). This contrasts the rigorous criteria 
that a plaintiff must satisfy to demonstrate both factual and legal causation at the 
merits stage. See infra Section II.B. Causation.  
41. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (a plaintiff must show that “it [is] likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”) (internal citations omitted). Note also that the burden is on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that all three prongs of standing test are satisfied. See DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (parties asserting jurisdiction must “carry the 
burden of establishing their standing under Article III”). 
42. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 
(2011). This is particularly the case with environmental claims. See e.g., Daniel A. 
Farber, Standing on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing 
Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 121 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/standing-
on-hot-air-american-electric-power-and-the-bankruptcy-of-standing-doctrine (“The 
unpredictability and ideological nature of standing law seems inherent in the three-
part test, whose terms seem to serve as a kind of Rorschach inkblot allowing each 
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Thus far, standing has not barred climate litigation for 
governmental petitioners.43  Some scholars have argued that it 
may pose a challenge for non-governmental plaintiffs,44 given 
that at least one lower court has rejected a climate claim by a 
non-governmental petitioner for failure to satisfy the causation 
portion of the standing requirement45 (although that case did 
not involve a claim for climate damages). However, in 
Connecticut, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled 
that the three plaintiff land trusts, which feared their land 
holdings would be impacted by climate change, had standing to 
seek an injunction, suggesting that at least some non-
governmental plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate standing.46 
In addition, other scholars have pointed out that plaintiffs may 
avoid standing barriers simply by avoiding the jurisdictions 
issuing such denials.47 However, whether a plaintiff can 
                                               
Justice to project her own worldview onto each case. The Court has never defined what 
constitutes an ‘injury’ for purposes of standing, leaving it to each Justice to decide 
what kinds of grievances should be considered cognizable injuries. The second element 
is a mirror in which the judge can perceive her own preferences—when an injury is 
‘fairly traceable’ is simply a question of what a judge regards as fair. The third element 
replicates the problems of the first one, since the Court must decide whether the 
benefits sought by the plaintiff through the remedy should count for constitutional 
purposes. One need only look at Massachusetts, where the conservatives were certain 
that the case failed all three prongs of the test whereas the liberals were equally 
certain that it passed the hurdles.”). See also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of 
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988); Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 
40 (in the past, courts have used standing—particularly the causation requirement, 
discussed in more detail below—”to avoid reaching the merits on [environmental law] 
cases they are unwilling or unable to decide.”). 
43. See, e.g., American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011); 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007); 
PEEL, supra note 30, at 271–73. 
44. See PEEL, supra note 30, at 271 (“Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has 
twice found standing in the context of climate change, those cases—with their state 
government petitioners—did not resolve broader issues about who can bring which 
kinds of climate change-related claims.”). 
45. See, e.g., Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 
2013). However, note that this case does not constitute “climate damages litigation” 
according to the criteria set out in this Article, as it involved a non-governmental 
plaintiff seeking to compel a governmental agency to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions. Note also that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision in 
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut found that land trusts had standing to 
bring an application for injunction, which lends support to the proposition that at least 
some non-governmental plaintiffs may have standing. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).  
46. American Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d, rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 
(2011). 
47. See PEEL, supra note 30, at 274 (“standing likely will only be a barrier for 
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demonstrate standing will depend largely on the facts of the 
case and the rights the plaintiffs allege have been harmed. 
3. Displacement 
According to the displacement doctrine, U.S. courts cannot 
consider cases involving issues of national concern that are 
statutorily regulated by the other branches of government. In 
situations where a “statute speaks directly to the question at 
issue,” federal common law (of public nuisance, etc.) is 
displaced.48 The most relevant federal statute in climate 
change litigation is the Clean Air Act.49 
Displacement may pose the greatest barrier for climate 
damages litigation in the United States.50 In Connecticut, a 
case concerning a claim seeking injunctive relief rather than 
damages per se, the Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Air 
Act displaced the federal common law in relation to an action 
for “curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions.”51 The Court did 
not rule on whether the Act also displaced state common law.52 
In Kivalina—one of only two U.S. cases that have involved a 
plaintiff claiming compensation for climate change-related 
damages from a non-governmental defendant—the court 
interpreted Connecticut as meaning that a claim for damages 
under the federal common law was similarly displaced by the 
Clean Air Act,53 despite the fact that the Clean Air Act does 
                                               
nongovernmental petitioners in jurisdictions that are issuing such denials; pairing 
with governmental petitioners will help address the issue even in those places.”). 
48. Mark Belleville & Katherine Kennedy, Cool Lawsuits: Is Climate Change 
Litigation Dead After Kivalina v. ExxonMobil?, 7 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 
51, 58, 80 (2012–2013). 
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2016). 
50. See Belleville, supra note 48, at 74 (arguing that of the four ‘jurisdictional bars’ 
to climate damages litigation, the current state of the law suggests that displacement 
is the most significant issue). 
51. American Electric Power Co., 564 U.S. at 423. 
52. Id. at 429 (“In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal 
common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the 
preemptive effect of the federal Act. . . . None of the parties have briefed preemption or 
otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore 
leave the matter open for consideration on remand.”) (citing International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987)). 
53. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which itself is being displaced by the 
rising sea. But the solution to Kivalina’s dire circumstance must rest in the hands of 
the legislative and executive branches of our government, not the federal common 
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not directly address liability or apportionment of responsibility 
for damages. The extent to which this decision is adopted as 
“the law of the land” will determine the success of future 
claims for damages under federal common law.54 
It is worth noting, however, that the type of climate 
compensation act discussed in Section IV would avoid issues of 
displacement (and the political questions doctrine) by allowing 
the legislative branch to explicitly authorize an appropriate 
role for the judiciary in climate damages litigation.55 
4. Pre-emption 
Some scholars have also discussed pre-emption as a barrier 
to litigation.56 The pre-emption doctrine, often conflated with 
displacement, is derived from Article VI of the U.S. 
Constitution and provides that, in cases of conflict, federal 
common law and statutory law pre-empt state law.57 
Given the uncertainty regarding whether non-governmental 
petitioners have standing to pursue a federal public nuisance 
claim, climate change plaintiffs often invoke state law 
(generally nuisance, negligence, and trespass) either in 
addition to or in place of federal common law.58 While 
defendants would likely argue that state law claims are pre-
empted by the Clean Air Act,59 the statute includes provisions 
that explicitly state that they are not.60 
                                               
law.”). See Belleville, supra note 48, at 59, 74–84 for a critique of the application of the 
displacement doctrine in this case. 
54. Belleville, supra note 48, at 74. 
55. See infra Section IV, “Climate Damages Litigation.” 
56. See, e.g., Belleville, supra note 48, at 73–74 (explaining that federal legislation 
‘displaces’ federal common law, while state law is ‘preempted’ by federal law, both 
common and legislated). Notably, other comprehensive overviews of barriers to climate 
litigation have not included preemption. See, e.g., PEEL, supra note 30, at 271. 
57. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States . . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
58. Specifically, this uncertainty concerns whether nongovernmental petitions can 
pursue federal public nuisance claims, and whether other federal common law theories 
can adequately address the damage suffered. See Belleville, supra note 48, at 72–73; 
see also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854; Kivalina, 663 F. 
Supp. 2d at 869. 
59. See Belleville, supra note 48, at 77; Gerrard, supra note 16, at 574 (“[T]he 
defendants would certainly argue that the CAA [Clean Air Act] displaces [preempts] 
state common law nuisance claims as well.”). 
60. See 42 U.S.C § 7604(e) (2012). 
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In any event, it is certainly possible that, at some point, a 
climate damages claim with the correct combination of parties, 
judge, and forum will be able to succeed on the threshold 
issues and proceed to the merits stage of examination. In such 
a case, causation issues will come under greater judicial 
scrutiny.61 
B. Causation 
In order to recover damages in tort litigation, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate a causal relationship between the 
defendant’s action or behavior and the injury suffered. This 
entails meeting the requirements set out for both factual 
causation and proximate (legal) causation at the merits 
stage.62 
Both factual and proximate causation present challenges for 
climate damages litigation; many scholars consider these 
requirements as the most significant barriers to liability.63 As 
                                               
61. There has been substantial disagreement in the courts and among commentators 
about when factual causation should be analyzed: during the standing phase or 
afterwards on the merits. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 42, at 122. In most cases, during 
the standing phase, courts find causation when the damage is ‘fairly traceable’ to the 
defendant’s action or behavior—however, “the standard for what is considered fairly 
traceable is unclear. In some cases, a but-for causal connection has been considered 
sufficient for standing purposes.” Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 40, at 
2264–65. Should courts choose to incorporate more rigorous factual causation inquiries 
in the standing phase, as suggested by the concurring judgment in Kivalina, it may 
result in climate damage claims being thrown out prematurely. See id. at 2272 
(arguing “[s]hifting some of the factual analysis for establishing causation out of 
standing analysis would help reduce the bias against finding standing in 
environmental suits”). See also Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 
F.3d 849, 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (concurring opinion). 
62. Note that the Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces the term ‘proximate cause’ 
with ‘scope of liability’, while the Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects the term in 
favor of ‘legal cause’. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF 
PHYSICAL HARM § 29 (AM. LAW INST., 2012); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
431 (AM. LAW INST. (1965). Note also that both factual and proximate causation are 
requirements in all forms of tort claims. See Kysar, supra note 28, at 17 (“[N]or will it 
necessarily matter whether plaintiffs’ case is styled as a negligence, strict liability, 
private nuisance, public nuisance, or products liability action, given the availability of 
proximate causation and other liability-curtailing devices under each theory.”) At least 
one scholar, however, has argued that proximate causation was not required in the 
public nuisance case Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d 
Cir. 2000), although he notes that this does not appear to be the majority approach. 
See Grossman, supra note 9, at 27 n.130. 
63. See, e.g., Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate 
Change Litigation Against Corporate Defendants, 35 BNA ENV’T REP. 2365, 2369 
(2004) (“Causation is the crucial issue for defendants because it will be the most 
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a U.S. court has yet to consider a climate damages claim on the 
merits, this Section draws on the approaches adopted by courts 
to address similar causation challenges in other types of 
claims, such as environmental, toxic, and mass torts.64 
1. Factual Causation 
Factual causation is primarily concerned with the scientific 
relationship between the defendant’s action or behavior and 
the alleged injury, and is often broken down further into 
general causation and specific causation.65 General causation 
refers to whether the action in question could have caused the 
alleged injury, while specific causation refers to whether the 
action in question “more likely than not” actually caused the 
alleged injury.66 
a. General Causation 
General causation is considered an objective inquiry, and is 
often established through statistical, probabilistic, and 
epidemiological studies.67 For example, in toxic tort cases such 
as those involving Agent Orange, plaintiffs relied upon 
scientific data demonstrating the association between exposure 
to the substance and health problems as evidence of general 
causation.68 
In the context of a climate damages case, for example, 
                                               
difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate . . . ”); Kysar, supra note 28, at 29 (“The most 
significant challenge for climate change tort suits lies in proving causation.”); 
Penalver, supra note 9, at 564, 579 (“[S]ome of the obstacles to a tort approach to 
climate change [include] establishing causation, calculating the proper remedies, and 
choosing a structure for implementing a tort-based approach. The greatest of these 
problems is that of causation.”). 
64. Others have noted the parallels between toxic tort cases and climate change 
cases. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 22; Penalver, supra note 9, at 579. 
65. Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 40 at 2262; Penalver, supra note 9, 
at 579. Note that general causation has also been referred to as “generic causation” 
and specific causation has also been referred to as “individual causation.” 
66. Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-7657, 1997 WL 535163, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 18, 1997); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1352 (N.D. 
Ga. 2001) (citing Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1999)) 
(defining general causation as “the capacity of a product to cause injury,” and specific 
causation as “proof that the product in question caused the injury of which the plaintiff 
complains.”). 
67. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 22. 
68. Id. 
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statistical models found in studies such as those released by 
the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) could be used to demonstrate that greenhouse 
gas emissions could have caused a rise in sea-levels and 
consequent property damage.69 The U.S. Supreme Court 
confirmed the scientific consensus regarding climate change in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,70 further supporting the argument for 
general causation. 
b. Specific Causation 
In contrast, courts have not considered studies such as those 
undertaken by the IPCC as adequate evidence of specific 
causation.71 Most often, specific causation is established 
through the “but for” test, which requires proof that a 
defendant’s actions or behavior were “a necessary element” in 
bringing about the injury before liability can apply.72 
As others have pointed out,73 the “but for” causal inquiry 
presents unique problems for climate damages plaintiffs: it 
may be difficult to demonstrate that damage suffered by a 
plaintiff was the result of climate change.74 Furthermore, even 
                                               
69. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 7 at 4. Note that 
in toxic torts cases, there are also challenges associated with determining which 
experts and studies to allow. See, e.g., Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, Whither 
Daubert? Reliable Resolution of Scientifically-Based Causality Issues in Toxic Tort 
Cases, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 565–67 (1998). 
70. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 504 (2007) (“A 
well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase 
in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe 
the two trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it 
acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of 
reflected heat. It is therefore a species—the most important species—of a ‘greenhouse 
gas.’”). See also Jennifer Kilinski, International Climate Change Liability, 18 J. 
TRANSNATIONAL L. & POL. 377, 400–01 (2009). 
71. Grossman, supra note 9, at 23. 
72. See Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation Doctrines Central to 
Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2009) (“under orthodox common law 
rules concerning causation, a tortfeasor is liable for an indivisible injury that would 
not have happened absent that party’s breach.”); Richard W. Wring, Causation, 
Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 
1019 (1988) (defining specific cause as a “necessary element in a set of antecedent 
actual conditions that were sufficient for the occurrence of the result.”). 
73. See, e.g., Michael Duffy, Climate Change Causation: Harmonizing Tort Law and 
Scientific Probability, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH & ENVTL. L. 185 (2009); Kysar, supra note 
28. 
74. The ability of a plaintiff to demonstrate, on a preponderance of evidence, that 
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where a plaintiff can establish such a link, the actions of a sin-
gle defendant, or even a group of defendants, would not have 
caused climate change alone. In other words, the emissions of a 
single greenhouse gas producer cannot be singled out as a 
“necessary element” for the damage caused by climate change. 
Toxic tort claims are plagued by similar issues of identifying 
a “but for” cause. As a result, courts have developed a series of 
alternative approaches for determining specific causation in 
cases where “it is either impossible or overwhelmingly 
burdensome to isolate causation among defendants.”75 These 
approaches, some of which are outlined below, suggest that a 
court could find specific causation in a climate damages case 
given the right facts, combination of parties, judge, and forum. 
i. Material Contribution Approach 
Sometimes referred to as the “substantial-factor test,” the 
material contribution approach to causation is useful where 
“two forces are actively operating, one because of the 
defendant’s [activity], the other not because of any misconduct 
on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm 
                                               
climate change caused the damages complained of will depend on the type of damages 
claimed and the available scientific evidence. Damages that arise from ongoing shifts 
in climate, such as the costs of adapting infrastructure to changing regional conditions 
or the spread of new pests or weeds beyond their historic range, may be more easily 
linked to climate change than, for instance, damages from a single weather event. For 
example, the Kivalina case—concerning the relocation of a village due to a pattern of 
storms and early melting of sea ice—falls within this category of damages claims. 663 
F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). However, even in relation to single weather events, 
there are new scientific methodologies that can provide a statistical link between 
climate change and particular events, particularly in the case of heat waves, drought 
and extreme precipitation. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, 
ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/21852/attribution-
of-extreme-weather-events-in-the-context-of-climate-change; Stephanie C. Herring et 
al., Explaining Extreme Events of 2014 from a Climate Perspective, 96 BULL. AMER. 
METEOR. SOC. S1 (2015), http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/BAMS-
ExplainingExtremeEvents2014.1. 
75. Daniel J. Grimm, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A Proposed 
Model for Allocating Tort Damages among CO2 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209, 
216 (2007) (citing James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and 
Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 659, 659 (2000) (“plaintiffs have been permitted to recover under market share 
liability ‘without proof of individual causation.’”)). Grimm argues that market share 
liability is one such approach, and would provide “an ideal platform for developing a 
liability regime capable of managing climate change-based torts.” Id. at 211. 
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to another.”76 In such cases, the court may find liability where 
a defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing 
about or a material contribution to the plaintiff’s injury.77 
Courts in the United States have favored the material 
contribution approach in environmental and toxic torts cases 
where a chemical or environmental factor could have 
independently caused the injury at issue.78 As Smith and 
Shearman explain, “[a] test based on a material increase in 
risk would clearly improve the prospects of success for climate 
change plaintiffs.”79 
ii. Co-Mingled Product Approach 
Courts in the United States developed the co-mingled 
product approach in response to cases involving groundwater 
contamination from the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl 
ether (MTBE). According to one U.S. district court, “[w]hen a 
plaintiff can prove that certain gaseous or liquid products . . . 
of many suppliers were present in a completely commingled or 
blended state at the time and place that the risk of harm 
occurred, and the commingled product caused a single 
indivisible injury, then each of the products should be deemed 
to have caused the harm.”80 
Some commentators have identified the co-mingled product 
approach as potentially applicable to climate damages 
litigation.81 Indeed, greenhouse gas emissions resemble MTBE 
in significant ways; emissions have no “chemical signature” 
                                               
76. Shelly Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of 
the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
1289, 1297 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)). 
77. See, e.g., Shetterly v. Raymark Indus., 117 F.3d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1997) (“In 
order to sustain an action against Raymark for asbestos related injuries, Plaintiffs 
must prove that Raymark products were a substantial causative factor in their 
injuries.”) (internal citations omitted). 
78. Id. at 1303–04. 
79. JOSEPH SMITH & DAVID SHEARMAN, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: ANALYSING 
THE LAW, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND 
PROPERTY 110 (2006). 
80. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 377–78 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
81. See, e.g., Lauren Case, Climate Change: A New Realm of Tort Litigation and 
How to Recover When the Litigation Heats Up, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265, 286–88 
(2011). 
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which would allow them to be traced to particular emitters, 
and they co-mingle in the global atmosphere.82 
iii. Market Share Approach 
Courts in the United States developed the market share 
approach in the context of litigation brought by women who 
claimed to have suffered injuries due to ingestion of 
diethylstilbestrol (DES) by their mothers during pregnancy, 
allowing courts to assign liability for harm caused by a product 
based on a defendant’s respective “share” in the manufacture 
and sale of the product.83 
As one scholar has suggested, “a market share-based 
liability regime may actually approximate specific causation 
better when applied to global warming than when applied to 
chemically fungible products like DES.”84 Greenhouse gas 
producers could be held liable for climate damages according to 
their share of global CO2 emissions.85 Recent studies 
quantifying the relative contribution of major fossil fuel 
companies to global greenhouse gas emissions would facilitate 
the use of such an approach in the climate damages context. 
Importantly, a recent study by Richard Heede—elaborated in 
Section V—found ninety entities responsible for 63 percent of 
total greenhouse gas emissions to date, and determined the 
percentages attached to each individual entity.86 
2. Proximate Causation 
Proximate causation incorporates a policy dimension absent 
in factual causation inquiries, asking whether the defendant’s 
action or behavior is sufficiently related to the injury to hold 
them liable for the resulting damages.87 In other words, 
                                               
82. See Case, supra note 81, at 286–88, 295–97. 
83. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (N.Y. 1989); Enright v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377 (N.Y. 1991) (affirming the use of a market share approach). 
84. Grimm, supra note 75, at 221. See also Case, supra note 81, at 293 (explaining 
“[m]arket share liability theory is perhaps the best collective liability theory for 
plaintiffs in climate change cases.”). 
85. See Grimm, supra note 75, at 221; Penalver, supra note 9, at 564, 579. 
86. See generally Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and 
Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 229 (2014). 
87. See Brinker, supra note 76, at 1297; Nancy Lee Firak, Alternative Forms of 
Liability: Developing Policy Aspects of the Cause-in-Fact Requirement of Tort Law, 20 
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proximate causation is used to limit liability in cases where the 
requirements of factual causation are satisfied, yet notions of 
reasonableness suggest a defendant should not be held 
responsible.88 
As one scholar has stated, “[t]he touchstone of proximate 
causation is ‘foreseeability.’”89 That is, a defendant can only be 
held liable for the damages that are the foreseeable result of 
their action or behavior, regardless of the strength of the 
factual causal relationship.90 Other factors considered in the 
context of proximate causation include the geographic and 
temporal distance between the action or behavior and the 
damage, and the defendant’s degree of involvement in or 
control over the plaintiff’s injury.91 
In the context of climate damages claims, scholars have 
generally argued that proximate causation will present fewer 
                                               
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1042 (1988). 
88. See Grimm, supra note 75, at 227. 
89. Benjamin Reese, Too Many Cooks in the Climate Change Kitchen: The Case for 
an Administrative Remedy for Damages Caused by Increased Greenhouse Gas 
Concentrations, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 355, 367 (2015). As Reese points out, 
“foreseeability” has been considered part of both the duty and causation of negligence 
claims. Id. at 367 n. 72. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 28, at 10–20 (arguing that “for 
purposes of limning [sic] greenhouse gas tort responsibilities, it may not matter 
whether plaintiffs’ claims hit a road block at the duty stage á [sic] la Cardozo, or only 
later at the proximate causation stage á [sic] la Andrews, given the analytical 
challenges facing plaintiffs will be similar in either case.”). See also Young v. Bryco 
Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (“Legal causation is essentially a question 
of foreseeability.”). 
90. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in 
Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 664 
(2000) (foreseeability is necessary to determine if “the type of harm suffered by the 
plaintiff was, qualitatively and quantitatively, of such a nature that a reasonable 
person would have taken it into account in performing the risk-utility calculus 
relevant to deeming the defendant’s conduct negligent.”); Gerrard, supra note 16, at 
592 (“A party is only liable for expected harms from their bad conduct. Where the 
action is intentional or reckless, this liability extends even to harms that were 
unlikely.”). 
91. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 25–27; City of Bloomington, Ind. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that Monsanto was not liable for 
nuisance because “Westinghouse was in control of the product purchased and was 
solely responsible for the nuisance it created.”); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(“MTBE”), 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (suggesting that a defendant can 
be held liable for damages, even if others outside of the defendant’s control contributed 
to the injury). On the relevance of temporal and geographic distance in causation, see 
Shannon Roesler, Responding to Climate-Related Harms: A Role for the Courts?, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY THE 
IPCC 181, 185–91 (Robin Craig & Stephen Miller eds., 2016). 
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challenges than factual causation.92 It is reasonable to argue 
that climate damages were foreseeable by greenhouse gas 
producers since at least the first IPCC study was released in 
1990.93 As our understanding of climate science and its 
impacts continues to improve the foreseeability of damages 
will only increase.94 
Similarly, a plaintiff could reasonably argue that the 
defendants exercised sufficient control over climate damages. 
Unlike in handgun cases, where damages were found to have 
been caused by individuals misusing the product in a manner 
outside the control of the manufacturer,95 no misuse is 
involved with fossil fuels. Individuals use emission-producing 
products in the manner intended by the manufacturer, making 
the resulting damage both foreseeable and controllable.96 
As this Section outlines, while the threshold issues and 
causation challenges facing climate litigation are formidable, 
legal tools exist that plaintiffs could potentially use as a basis 
for finding U.S. greenhouse gas producers liable for climate 
change-related damages given the right facts, combination of 
parties, judge, and forum. 
III. TRANSNATIONAL CLIMATE DAMAGES LITIGATION 
Most scholars have focused on the potential success of 
climate damages litigation involving U.S. plaintiffs seeking to 
have their claims against U.S. defendants heard in U.S. 
courts.97 U.S. emissions, however, cause climate change in 
conjunction with emissions produced by a large number of 
                                               
92. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 89, at 368; Grossman, supra note 9, at 25–27. 
93. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 27. Note also recent reports suggesting that the 
largest U.S. greenhouse gas producer, ExxonMobil, knew about climate change as 
early as 1981. See Suzanne Goldberg, Exxon Knew of Climate Change in 1981, Email 
Says – But It Funded Deniers for 27 More Years, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/08/exxon-climate-change-1981-
climate-denier-funding. 
94. See David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in 
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. ST. L. Rev. 1742, 1780–81 (2007). 
95. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 26–27 (discussing municipal claims against 
handgun manufacturer, particularly Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. 
Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d. 536 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
96. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 27. 
97. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9; Case, supra note 81; Hunter & Salzman, supra 
note 27; Penalver, supra note 9; Gifford, supra note 28; Kysar, supra note 28. 
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producers around the world.98 The effects of these emissions 
are felt in different ways by the people of different countries.99 
This Section introduces the first of two potentialities that 
could change the climate damages litigation landscape 
significantly and rapidly: transnational litigation. Specifically, 
it discusses the possibility of a foreign plaintiff bringing a 
climate damages claim against a U.S. non-governmental 
defendant, such as a greenhouse gas producer, in a U.S. court. 
This Section also examines the perhaps more significant 
possibility of a foreign plaintiff suing a U.S. greenhouse gas 
producer in a foreign country, and then seeking to have that 
judgment recognized in the United States or in other countries 
in which the U.S. defendant has assets. These scenarios 
present complex questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
A. Jurisdiction 
In the United States, a court must possess both subject 
matter jurisdiction and in personam or personal jurisdiction in 
order to consider a case.100 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to 
a court’s ability to hear and decide a particular type of case, 
whereas personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s ability to 
exercise jurisdiction over the actors involved.101 As legal 
scholar Richard Lord writes, “a right is of little use unless a 
tribunal can be found to uphold and enforce it.”102 
                                               
98. Hunter, supra note 27, at 1745. 
99. See generally CLIMATE VULNERABILITY FORUM & DARA, supra note 3. 
100. Subject matter jurisdiction is also referred to as “jurisdiction to prescribe,” 
while in personam or personal jurisdiction is also referred to as “jurisdiction to 
adjudicate” according to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations LAW pt. IV, 
introductory n. (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Jurisdictional issues are generally analyzed in 
this order. See DAVID EPSTEIN & CHARLES S BALDWIN, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A 
GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY 95 (4th ed. 2010). Note that for the 
sake of clarity, this Article will use the terms subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
or in personam jurisdiction as opposed to the terms used in the Restatement. 
101. See EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 95; Zasloff, supra note 9, at 1875–80, for a 
discussion of whether a U.S. court might assert jurisdiction against an Indian car 
company, Tata, for climate-related damage caused in the United States, the reverse of 
the scenario being discussed here. 
102. Lord, supra note 16, at 44. 
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1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Both state and federal courts can exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction over cases involving multiple jurisdictions,103 
although much transnational litigation occurs at a federal 
level.104 Notably, Article III of the U.S. Constitution, along 
with federal statutes, authorizes federal courts to exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction over diversity actions between U.S. 
and foreign citizens,105 actions based on the Alien Tort Claims 
Act,106 and actions against foreign states under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.107 
However, federal courts may decline to exercise subject 
matter jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.108 
                                               
103. Most state courts are courts of “general jurisdiction,” meaning they are 
assumed to have subject matter jurisdiction over any case falling under state or 
federal law. Federal courts, on the other hand, are courts of “specific jurisdiction,” 
meaning they can only exercise subject matter jurisdiction explicitly granted by U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2 and federal statute. See, e.g., Verlinden BV v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) (“Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts beyond the bounds established by the Constitution.”); Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (explaining 
that federal subject matter jurisdiction is “limited to those subjects encompassed 
within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.”) Notably, the types of cases enumerated 
under Article III are not the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, and state courts 
can exercise concurrent jurisdiction unless expressly forbidden by Congress. See 
EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 96–97 (quoting Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over 
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA L. REV. 85, 123 n.142 (1983)). 
104. U.S. federal courts and federal law have generally been perceived as being 
hospitable to transnational litigation. See Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal 
Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 
N.C. L. Rev. 995, 998 (2015). Additionally, foreign defendants have a right to remove 
the case from a state court to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) & (b) 
(2012). The most common types of transnational litigation in state courts include torts, 
family law, and employment law. See EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 96–99; GARY BORN & 
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 10 
(5th ed. 2011). 
105.  U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3) (2012). Note that the amount in 
controversy must exceed $75,000 to be considered by a court under diversity of 
citizenship. Id. § 1332. 
106. Id. § 1350 (2012). 
107. Id. § 1330(a) (2012). Note that federal courts also exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction over: (1) “cases involving federal questions arising under the U.S. 
Constitution, statutes, and regulations,” id. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship 
cases, between citizens of different U.S. states,” id. § 1332, although these grants of 
jurisdiction are less applicable in international litigation. See BORN, supra note 104, at 
11. 
108. BORN, supra note 104, at 384. Courts may also decline to exercise jurisdiction 
on the basis of international comity and unreasonableness. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, 
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While weight is given to the plaintiff’s choice of forum,109 the 
forum non conveniens doctrine allows courts to dismiss a case 
after examining the various private and public interests 
involved, if a foreign court would be “adequate” and 
substantially more convenient or appropriate.110 
Therefore, if a foreign plaintiff sues a U.S. non-
governmental defendant for transnational climate damages, a 
U.S. court could foreseeably find subject matter jurisdiction. 
This jurisdiction could be based on the “diverse citizenship” of 
the parties involves, the headquarters of the defendants, or the 
quantity of greenhouse gas emissions occurring within the 
United States.111 However, a U.S. defendant may seek to have 
                                               
at 128. According to EPSTEIN, the comity and unreasonableness rules emerge from the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). See, e.g., 
Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th 
Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 
1979). Under the doctrine of comity, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction in 
cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction, and a substantial conflict between U.S. 
laws and the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, whereas the unreasonableness rule 
provides that a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction where it appears to be 
unreasonable. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1046–49 
(2d Cir. 1996). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 121–30, for a more in-depth 
discussion of these two limitations of subject matter jurisdiction. 
109. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). See generally 
Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL. 
L. REV. 1259 (1986). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the selection of a 
U.S. court by a foreign plaintiff “will likely make a forum less convenient than will the 
presence of a local plaintiff.” RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI ET AL., FORUM 
NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 116 (2007). As a result, in 
transnational litigation, “a foreign plaintiff’s choice [of forum] deserves less deference 
[than a local plaintiff’s choice].” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 
(1981). 
110. See EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 119 (summarizing the forum non conveniens 
test articulated in Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
The test is as follows (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original): 
   First, determine whether there is an adequate alternative forum that can try 
the entire case; 
   Second, “consider all relevant factors of private interests, weighing in the 
balance a strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs’ initial form choice;” 
   Third, if the balance of interest is in or near “equipoise,” consider whether the 
public interest favors a foreign forum; 
   Fourth, if the balance favors a foreign forum, ensure that plaintiffs can 
reinstate their suit in the alternative forum without “undue inconvenience or 
prejudice.” For an overview of the forum non conveniens doctrine, see also 
BORN, supra note 104, at 365–459. 
111. Note that it is unlikely that a foreign plaintiff could bring a climate action 
against a U.S. defendant on the basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), as the Act 
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the case dismissed based on forum non conveniens, arguing 
that an adequate alternative forum for litigation exists, and 
that private and public interest favour this alternative 
forum.112 The success of such an argument would depend on 
whether the defendant would be amenable to being sued in an 
adequate alternative forum, likely a court in the plaintiff’s 
home state.113 
2. Personal Jurisdiction 
Both state and federal courts can exercise personal 
jurisdiction over transnational litigation where authorized by 
statute114 and consistent with the constitutional principles of 
due process.115 According to the test outlined in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, due process requires that a defendant 
have minimum contacts with the forum such that the exercise 
of jurisdiction accords with the notions of “fair play and 
                                               
only applies to torts “committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). As of yet, the United States is not party to 
any treaty that forbids—or even limits—the emissions of greenhouse gases. See 
Gerrard, supra note 16, at 44. Perhaps even more importantly, in its modern revival 
(post-1980), the ATCA has only been applied to conduct committed outside the United 
States. 
112. This was the argument made in Texaco Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Its Renewed Motions to Dismiss Based on Forum Non Conveniens and International 
Comity at 22–51, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No-93 Civi. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999). 
See also Howard Erichson, The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute, Forum Non Conveniens, and 
the Problem of Ex Ante Inadequacy, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 417, 425 (2013). 
113. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at 254 n.22 (1981) (“At the outset of 
any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an 
alternative forum.”). Based on this case, “an alternative forum is normally considered 
adequate if the defendant is subject to jurisdiction in the alternative forum even if the 
alternative forum has [different] laws.” Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of 
the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 517 (2009). 
114. See BORN, supra note 104, at 82 (“All the states of the Union have enacted 
statutes (or rules of court) defining the personal jurisdiction of state courts over non-
resident defendants.”) See generally ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
§ 4.01 (2d ed. 1991) (describing and reproducing state long-arm statutes). Statutory 
authorization for federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which allows federal 
courts to (1) “borrow” the long arm statute of the state in which they sit; (2) exercise 
personal jurisdiction according to applicable federal statute; or (3) exercise personal 
jurisdiction within the limits of the Constitutional principles of due process in certain 
federal question cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. (4)(k). See also BORN, supra note 104, at 74. 
115. Note also that unlike with subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant can, either 
explicitly or implicitly, waive personal jurisdiction. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 173. 
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substantial justice.”116 
While there is a lack of consensus regarding what actions 
satisfy the minimum contacts requirement,117 courts will 
generally consider: (1) the quantity of contacts with the forum 
state; (2) the nature and quality of contacts; (3) the source and 
connection of the cause of action with these contacts; (4) the 
interest of the state in providing a forum; and (5) the 
convenience of the parties, when determining whether to 
exercise personal jurisdiction.118 
The factors relevant to determining whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction accords with the notions of fair play and 
substantial justice include: “(1) [the] burden on the defendant 
in litigation in the forum state; (2) the interests of the forum 
state; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) the 
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest 
of the several states in further fundamental substantive social 
policies.”119 
In the context of a transnational climate damages claim 
involving a foreign plaintiff suing a U.S. greenhouse gas 
producer, a U.S. court would likely find that exercising 
personal jurisdiction accords with the notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.120 A court would reach this decision by 
applying the factors relevant to determining whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction accords with the notions of fair 
play and substantial justice stated above to this scenario. In 
reference to the first factor, a U.S. greenhouse gas producer 
                                               
116. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945). 
117. Various standards have been adopted in state and federal courts. In Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court outlines two of the 
predominant standards used in courts: the “stream of commerce” theory, which allows 
courts to exercise jurisdiction where a consumer uses the defendant’s product in the 
forum, and a stricter “purposeful direction” standard, which allows courts to exercise 
jurisdiction only where a defendant has taken purposeful action towards the forum, 
such as advertising in the forum state or marketing a product through a regular 
channel. 480 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1987). See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 158–
66. 
118. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
119. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 164 (citations omitted). Courts generally agree that 
the stronger the connection between the defendant and the forum, the greater the 
burden on the defendant to show that such an exercise of jurisdiction in unreasonable.  
Id. 
120. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320 (discussing the test to determine whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate). 
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would be unlikely to suffer any burden in litigating in the 
United States. The United States would also have an interest 
as the forum state to consider the liability of U.S. greenhouse 
gas producers. The foreign plaintiff may have an interest in 
holding litigation in the United States in order to obtain relief 
in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s assets are located. 
A U.S. court would almost certainly find that minimum 
contacts exist between a U.S. defendant and the United States. 
Extensive or “general” contact, which can be established by 
domicile or incorporation, satisfies this minimum contacts 
requirement. This would allow a court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant “with respect to all claims 
arising from any of the defendant’s activities, including 
activities unrelated to the forum state.”121 
If the defendant’s interactions with the United States are 
less extensive than general contact, a U.S. court could still 
exercise personal jurisdiction based on “specific contacts.” This 
would limit the claims heard by a court to those “that are 
related to or arise out of a defendant’s contacts with the 
forum.”122 As one commentator noted, “[t]he line between 
general and specific [contacts] is obviously not a bright one, 
and the question will require a case-by-case analysis of the 
particular statutory grant of jurisdiction and the facts of each 
case.”123 A U.S. court could likely find personal jurisdiction 
based on a greenhouse gas producer’s either general or specific 
contacts with the United States, given the close relationship 
that exists between the nature of a foreign plaintiff’s claim and 
the activities of that producer. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the many 
diverse legal approaches in other countries related to personal 
jurisdiction. Yet, it is important to note that in many countries, 
personal jurisdiction can be exercised over defendants that are 
not connected with the jurisdiction, with leave of the court or 
otherwise, where the case involves harm to real property 
located within the jurisdiction.124 It is possible that U.S. 
                                               
121. BORN, supra note 104, at 83–84. Other factors considered when determining 
whether there is general jurisdiction include: nationality, residence, registration to do 
business, consent, waiver, and continuous and systemic activity. Id. at 109. 
122. BORN, supra note 104, at 90. 
123. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 167 (citations omitted). 
124. AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, STUDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 17 (Andrew Dickinson et al. eds., (2014) (“In most 
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defendants could find plaintiffs asserting personal jurisdiction 
over them notwithstanding that they have little or no presence 
in the jurisdiction. 
B. Choice of Law 
Once a court has established subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction over a case involving parties from multiple 
jurisdictions, it may be necessary for it to consider whether to 
apply domestic forum law or the foreign law of another 
country. While courts will select forum law most often,125 it is 
possible for courts, including those in the United States, to 
apply foreign law instead. Choice of law analysis describes the 
processes and rules used by courts to make this determination. 
Numerous scholars have described choice of law as a “dismal 
swamp, filled with quaking quagmires” due to its complex and 
changing nature.126 In the United States, choice of law regimes 
vary between states largely based on the First Restatement 
Conflict of Laws127 and Second Restatement Conflict of 
Laws.128 Some states, however, have adopted hybrid 
                                               
international cases, personal jurisdiction is established by service out of the 
jurisdiction pursuant to the rules of court, a form of delegated legislation which is 
made by Rules Committees of the courts.”). See, e.g., United Kingdom Practice 
Direction 6B, s. 3.1 (9) and (11); New Zealand High Court Rules, r. 9.27. See Andrew 
Gage & Margaretha Wewerinke, Taking Climate Justice into Our Own Hands: A 
Model Climate Compensation Act, WEST COAST ENVTL LAW  14–15 (2015), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906252 (discussing examples of national rules regarding 
jurisdiction). 
125. Empirical studies have found that modern choice-of-law systems, such as that 
found in the Second Restatement Conflict of Laws, tend to favor the application of 
forum law. See Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum 
Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 560–66 
(2002); Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 
Ga. L. Rev. 49, 86 (1992). See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law Revolution: 
An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 377–78 (1992). 
126. See William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
Many scholars have since taken up this analogy, including JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 231–32 (Aspen Publishers eds., 6th ed. 
2008). 
127. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1934). States that 
follow the traditional choice of law approach as articulated in the First Restatement 
Conflict of Laws include, Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. See In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., 
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, MDL No. 2100, 
2011 WL 1375011, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011). 
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1971). States that 
follow the significant relationship choice of law approach as articulated in the Second 
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regimes.129 
In U.S. states that follow the First Restatement Conflict of 
Laws, courts take a traditional territorial approach to the 
choice of law.130 They will generally apply the law of the place 
of wrong, defined as the place “where the last event necessary 
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort” occurred.131 This is 
usually, but not necessarily, the place of injury or damage.132 
In U.S. states that follow the more modern choice of law 
approach, set out in the Second Restatement Conflict of Laws, 
courts will consider factors other than the place of injury or 
damage. These include the place where the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred; the domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and 
the place where their relationship, if any, is centred.133 With 
these factors in mind, a court will determine and apply the law 
of the state with the “most significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties.”134 
                                               
Restatement Conflict of Laws include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. See In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, MDL No. 2100, 2011 WL 1375011, at *10–
13 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011). 
129. California and the District of Columbia have explicitly adopted the “government 
interest analysis” test to determine choice of law. See Herma Hill Kay, Currie’s Interest 
Analysis in the 21st Century: Losing the Battle, but Winning the War, 31 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 123, 126 (2001). The government interest analysis is a three-step test related 
to the Second Restatement’s significant relationship test, which involves determining 
(1) whether the laws in the two jurisdictions differ as applied to the facts of the case; 
(2) if they differ, whether a “true conflict” exists where each state has an interest in 
applying its laws; and (3) which state’s interest would be more impaired if its laws 
were not applied. See C.K. Liew v. Official Receiver & Liquidator, 685 F.2d 1192, 1196 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
130. See BORN, supra note 104, at 766. 
131. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 127, at § 377. 
132. See David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. 
REV. 1196, 1196–97 (1997). 
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 145. 
134.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 145. Courts 
will also consider: the needs of the interstate and international systems; the relevant 
policies of the state of the forum; the relevant policies of other interested states; the 
protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the particular field of 
law; certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and the ease in the 
determination and application of the law to be applied. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
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Under these principal choice-of-law regimes, a U.S. court 
could conceivably choose to apply foreign law to transnational 
climate litigation involving a foreign plaintiff and U.S. 
defendant. This scenario is more likely under the traditional 
choice-of-law approach in the First Restatement, which 
dictates that the law of the place of injury applies in 
transnational tort litigation.135 
As outlined above, the Second Restatement takes a broader 
approach when determining choice of law. Whether a court 
applies forum law or the law of the country where climate 
damages occurred will largely depend upon which country is 
deemed to have the “most significant relationship” with the 
parties and the dispute.136 
The relative benefits for foreign plaintiffs of either choice—
forum or foreign law—will depend largely upon the specifics of 
the case. Foreign plaintiffs are often drawn to U.S. courts for 
transnational litigation due to the (sometimes inaccurate) 
perception that U.S. tort law is more favorable than the law of 
the country where the injury or damage occurred.137 
However, the application of foreign law may be particularly 
attractive to foreign plaintiffs pursuing climate damages 
litigation in U.S. courts because of the different approaches 
and bases for liability in other countries. Lawyers from several 
countries and affiliated with the Environmental Law Alliance 
Worldwide have identified several countries with laws that are 
well suited for climate damages claims: 
We found that civil law jurisdictions are more likely to 
have a particular statute under which a case seeking 
compensation for climate damages could be filed. In 
particular, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico all have laws 
under which a climate-related claim could be filed. One 
exception is the common law country of Kenya, which 
                                               
CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 6(2). 
135. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 127, at § 377. See also 
BORN, supra note 104 at 766–67. 
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 145. 
137. The United States has long been a “magnet” forum for transnational litigation 
due to its pro-plaintiff legal environment, cultivated by “trial by jury, liberal pretrial 
discovery, representation by experienced litigators for a [contingency] feed […] 
substantially higher damage awards, and relatively prompt trial settings.” Walter W. 
Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign 
Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1177 (2005). 
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also has a relevant law that opens the door to climate 
litigation as well as a specialized environmental 
court. . . . 
Constitutions in some countries contain provisions that 
would support a climate damages case filed against a 
private corporation. Our research found clear 
indications that courts in Brazil and Colombia will hold 
private corporations liable for violating fundamental 
rights; and very likely that courts in Ecuador, India, 
Kenya and Mexico would do so, too. Because 
constitutional provisions can be coupled with strong 
laws in Brazil, Colombia, Kenya and Mexico, filing a 
case in one of these four countries gains even more 
appeal.138 
Given that the emissions that are alleged to be tortious do 
not occur in any one country, it might be argued that the tort, 
if it occurs anywhere, must occur in the jurisdiction where the 
harm occurs. That country may have a more significant 
relationship than a country where only some of the potential 
defendants reside and a small fraction of the emissions 
occurred. Regardless of the benefits of forum or foreign law, 
the forum court decides which law to apply.139 
                                               
138. ENVTL. LAW ALL. WORLDWIDE, Holding Corporations Accountable for Damaging 
the Climate 3 (2014), 
https://www.elaw.org/system/files/elaw.climate.litigation.report.pdf. See also 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, Oct. 5, 1988, art. 225 § 3 (“[T]he conduct 
and activities considered harmful to the environment shall subject the offender, 
individuals or legal entities, to criminal and administrative sanctions, regardless of 
the obligation to repair the damage caused.”); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 
1987 S.C. 1086, 1089–90 (expanding the ambit of Article 32 to allow Indian courts to 
compensate private party victims for Constitutional rights violations, including those 
breached by other private citizens, corporations, and legal persons); ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW INSTITUTE, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: GIVING FORCE TO 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN AFRICA 28 (2007). See generally Lord, supra note 16; 
Andrew Gage & Michael Byers, Payback Time: What the Internationalization of 
Climate Change Litigation Could Mean for Canadian Oil Companies 13, 18 (2014) 
(reviewing options available to climate damages plaintiffs under different legal 
systems). 
139. Note that some other countries have adopted more flexible rules relating to 
choice of law for transnational environmental litigation. According to the Rome II 
regulation, which is intended to apply across the European Union, the plaintiff has the 
choice whether to sue based on the laws of the “country where the damage occurred” or 
the country where “the event giving rise to the damage occurred.” Commission 
Regulation 864/2007 of July 11, 2007, On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40–49 (EC), http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32007R0864. As a result, if a court in an EU country 
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C. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
Given the threshold issues currently facing climate litigation 
in the United States, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that 
foreign plaintiffs will instead opt to sue U.S. defendants in 
their own courts.140 Alternatively, as mentioned above, a 
defendant may argue that a case should not be heard in the 
United States under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.141 
In either case, foreign plaintiffs may first obtain a judgment 
for climate change-related damages in a foreign court. 
Afterwards, they may seek to have that judgment recognized 
and enforced in other countries where the defendant’s assets 
are located, including the United States.142 
                                               
found jurisdiction over a climate change litigation case, perhaps on the basis of the 
particularly broad jurisdiction asserted in some of those countries, a U.S. greenhouse 
gas producer could be held to the law of the plaintiff’s choosing. The possibility that a 
U.S. court might then recognize and enforce the foreign judgment is discussed in the 
following Section. See also Lord, supra note 16, at 484 (“The Rome II regime is of 
potentially great significance in climate change litigation, where nationals in 
developing countries may allege damage suffered in those countries as a result of 
actions by corporations domiciled in the EU. Such corporations may be sued in their 
State of domicile, with the claimant able to rely on the law of his/her own State.”). 
140. Traditionally, foreign litigants have been drawn to the United States, “as a 
moth is drawn to the light.” Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, 
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 
SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 32 (2012) (quoting Lord Denning in Smith Kline & French Labs Ltd. 
v. Bloch, 1 W.L.R. 730, 711 (C.A. 1982)). However, according to some scholars, this 
unipolar era in transnational litigation has given way to greater multi-polarity. As the 
relative popularity of non-U.S. forums grows, it is likely there will be a proliferation of 
foreign judgments brought to the United States for recognition and enforcement—
along with the consequent challenges of determining foreign law. Id. at 37–38. See also 
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
481 (2011) (discussing and analyzing the data underpinning the assertion that U.S. 
transnational litigation is decreasing in popularity). 
141. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
142. See John B. Bellinger, III & R. Reeves Anderson, Tort Tourism: The Case for a 
Federal Law on Foreign Judgment Recognition, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 521 (2014). It 
may also be possible for a foreign plaintiff to seek to have a judgment recognized and 
enforced in a jurisdiction where the defendant itself does not have assets, but a 
subsidiary of the defendant does. For example, a recent Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision in Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation indicated that Ontario courts have 
jurisdiction to recognize and enforce judgments against the assets of an uninvolved 
subsidiary of a corporate defendant, providing that Ontario has jurisdiction over the 
subsidiary, and that there is an “economically significant relationship” between the 
subsidiary and the defendant. 2013 CanLII 758, para. 38 (Can. O.N.) appeal dismissed 
3 S.C.R. 69, 72 (2015). In the U.S., according to the ALI, a judgment can be enforced 
where the judgment debtor has assets or where they are subject to personal 
jurisdiction. See AMERICAN LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 9(b) (2006). 
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Traditionally, the United States has been perceived as 
“relatively friendly to recognizing and enforcing foreign 
judgments.”143 However, there is no uniform federal law 
governing this area. Instead, the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments is primarily governed by state law in both 
state and federal courts.144 Courts recognize and enforce 
foreign judgments on the following three bases: the 1962 
Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act,145 the 2005 
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition 
Act,146 and common law principles if neither of the previous 
statutes have been adopted.147 
All three bases for recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments stem from the comity doctrine,148 best defined in 
Hilton v. Guyot as “the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts 
                                               
143. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 596 (citations omitted); Ronald A. Brand, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, FED. JUD. CTR. 2 (2012). 
144. The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether 
state or federal law governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
However, the consensus among state courts and lower federal courts is that state law 
governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and federal courts will 
apply the law of the state in which they sit. As an exception to this rule, federal law 
will be applied in federal question cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF 
LAWS, supra note 128, at § 98 cmt. c. 
145. At its height, the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act was 
in force in over thirty states and the District of Columbia. Many of these states have 
since repealed the Act in favor of more recent legislation. For the full text, see 
UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENT RECOGNITION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1962) [hereinafter 1962 Act], 
https://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/UFMJRA.pdf. For a list of 
states that at one point adopted this statute, see BRAND, supra note 109 at app. D. 
146. The 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act is 
largely based on the 1962 Act, but clarifies procedural and substantive issues, and 
includes provisions relating to the burden of proof and statute of limitations. See 
UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 2; 9 (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE  OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2005), [hereinafter 2005 Act], 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%20money%20judgments
%20recognition/ufcmjra_final_05.pdf. At the time of writing, the 2005 Act was the 
most widely recognized base for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 
with eighteen states and the District of Columbia having adopted the statute in full or 
in part. See S. I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. 
Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33:1 REV. LITIG. 45, 67 (2014). 
147. The primary source of common law principles for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
(Am. Law Inst. 1987). 
148. BRAND, supra note 143, at 3. 
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of another nation.”149 Given the common origin of these bases 
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it is 
unsurprising that they apply to a similar subset of foreign 
judgments. That is, judgments that are “final, conclusive, and 
enforceable” and “grant or deny a sum of money.”150 
All three bases for recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments outline a series of mandatory and discretionary 
grounds for non-recognition with slight variances.151 In 
general, mandatory grounds for non-recognition apply, where: 
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which 
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures 
compatible with the requirements of due process of 
law; 
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant; or 
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter.152 
While a court must deny recognition if any of these three (or 
in the case of the Restatement, two) grounds exist, a court may 
deny recognition on other grounds as a matter of discretion.153 
Notably, there are a number of discretionary grounds for non-
                                               
149. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 158 (1895). According to Hilton v. Guyot, 
comity requires the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments “where there 
has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent 
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or 
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to 
secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country 
and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, 
or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the 
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it 
full effect . . . .” 
150. 2005 Act, supra note 146, at § 3 (a)(1)–(2); 1962 Act, supra note 145, at §§ 2–3; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 147, at § 481 (1). 
151. Mandatory grounds for non-recognition render the judgment necessarily non-
recognizable and non-enforceable, while discretionary grounds allow courts to 
interpret whether the circumstances of the specific case should make the judgment 
non-recognizable and non-enforceable. See BRAND, supra note 143, at 13–20; 20–24. 
152. See 2005 Act, supra note 146, at § 4(b)(1)–(3); 1962 Act supra note 145, at 
§ 4(a)(1)–(3); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 147, at 
§ 482 (1)(a)–(b). The 2005 Act states that these grounds render the judgment “non-
recognizable,” while the 1962 Act states that these grounds render the judgment “non-
conclusive”—which in effect makes then non-recognizable. Note also, in the Third 
Restatement Foreign Relations Law, no “jurisdiction over the subject matter” is a 
discretionary ground as opposed to a mandatory one for non-recognition. 
153. See Strong, supra note 146, at 70. 
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recognition, including where: 
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court 
did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient 
time to enable him to defend; 
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
(3) the claim for relief on which the judgment is based is 
repugnant to the public policy of this state; 
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and 
conclusive judgment; 
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to 
an agreement between the parties to otherwise 
settle the dispute; or 
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal 
service, the foreign court was an inconvenient forum 
for the trial of the action.154 
Where mandatory grounds for non-recognition do not apply, 
and where a discretionary basis for non-recognition does not 
exist or is not invoked, a judgment is “enforceable in the same 
manner as the judgment of a court of a sister state which is 
entitled to full faith and credit.”155 
The most common ground for non-recognition is lack of 
                                               
154. See 2005 Act, supra note 146, at § 4(c)(1)–(6); 1962 Act, supra note 145, at § 
4(b)(1)–(6); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 147, at § 
482 (2)(a)–(f). The 2005 Act adds two additional discretionary grounds for non-
recognition to this list, where: 
[T]he judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt 
about the integrity of the court with respect to the judgment; or the specific 
proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with 
the requirements of due process of law. 
155. 1962 Act, supra note 145, in Prefatory Note. According to the 2005 Act, a 
judgment is “enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a judgment 
rendered in this state.” Supra note 146, at § 7(2). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law also uses slightly different language, stating “a judgment entitled to 
recognition . . . may be enforced by any party . . . in accordance with the procedure for 
enforcement of judgments applicable where enforcement is sought.” supra note 147, at 
§ 481(2). In addition (though not included in either Act or according to common law 
principles), some states have passed legislation that makes ‘reciprocity’ an additional 
requirement for enforcement. In other words, the foreign court must likewise recognize 
and enforce judgments originating in the respective U.S. state or federal court. 
Florida, Idaho, Maine, and North Carolina have made reciprocity a statutory 
discretionary ground for recognition (no reciprocity a discretionary ground for non-
recognition), while Georgia and Massachusetts have made reciprocity a mandatory 
ground for recognition (no reciprocity a mandatory ground for non-recognition). See 
also Strong, supra 146, at 72. 
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personal jurisdiction.156 According to the 1962 Act, the 2005 
Act, and common law principles, a foreign issuing court must 
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the judgment 
in question to be recognized and enforced in the United 
States.157 While this requirement “appear[s] to consider the 
issue solely from the perspective of the court rendering the 
judgment in question,” U.S. courts often interpret this 
requirement using the U.S. standard for due process, including 
personal jurisdiction.158 
In the context of a judgment for climate change-related 
damages, the U.S. standards for personal jurisdiction can only 
be met if the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the 
foreign jurisdiction over which the issuing court presides.159 
These contacts must be such that a U.S. based greenhouse gas 
producer “could reasonably expect to be hauled into court”160 
without offending “traditional notions of fair play and 
justice.”161 
In a scenario where a U.S. court is considering whether a 
U.S. defendant has general or specific contacts with the foreign 
forum sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction, it is 
unclear whether the production of greenhouse gas emissions 
that cause climate damages only in combination with 
emissions originating elsewhere would be sufficient to meet 
the threshold test for “minimum contacts” established in 
International Shoe and World Wide Volkswagen. In the case of 
major U.S.-based greenhouse gas producers, it is reasonable to 
                                               
156. See BRAND, supra note 143, at 17. 
157. Strong, supra note 146, at 71. According to the 1962 Act and 2005 Act, there is 
personal jurisdiction “in cases of personal service, voluntary appearance, prior consent 
to jurisdiction of the foreign court, domicile, and commercial conduct.” Id. at 72; see 
also id. at 17. The common law principles of personal jurisdiction are largely the same, 
albeit slightly more complicated. Id. at 72; 1962 Act, supra note 145, at § 5(a); 2005 
Act, supra note 146, at § 5(a). 
158. Strong, supra note 146, at 72. This is particularly the case in states that adhere 
to common law principles rather than the 1962 Act or 2005 Act. According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, “even if the rendering court had 
jurisdiction under the laws of its own state, a court in the United States asked to 
recognize a foreign judgment should scrutinize the basis for asserting 
jurisdiction . . . .” Supra note 147, at § 482 cmt. c; see, e.g., Koster v. Automark Indus. 
Inc., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981); Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds Inc., 436 A.2d 942 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). 
159. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
160. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980). 
161. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. 
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assume they have operations and other connections worldwide, 
strengthening the ties between the defendant and the foreign 
jurisdiction, and the case for general or specific contacts.162 
Even if a U.S. court does not ultimately recognize and 
enforce a foreign judgment, many large greenhouse gas 
producers operate in multiple countries. This means that the 
judgment could conceivably be enforced in countries other than 
the United States,163 including countries which have a more 
relaxed approach to the requirements of personal 
jurisdiction.164 
As this Section demonstrates, transnational litigation 
involves complex and inter-related questions about which 
country’s courts should hear a climate damages case 
(jurisdiction), which country’s laws should apply (choice of 
law), and which countries could recognize and enforce a 
judgment obtained in a foreign forum (recognition and 
enforcement). 
Based on an analysis of the United States’ current approach 
to these questions, transnational climate damages litigation 
could increase the likelihood of climate damages liability for a 
U.S. greenhouse gas producer, simply by increasing the 
number of jurisdictions where such claims could be brought, 
                                               
162. The annual reports pursuant to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, completed by U.S. greenhouse gas producers as discussed in Section V, 
demonstrate the significant overseas holdings and operations of these companies. See 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012). See, e.g., CHEVRON CORP., 
ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 3–30, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000009341013000003/cvx-
123112x10kdoc.htm. 
163. For example, in Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, an Ecuadorian court found Chevron 
liable for environmental damages totaling $9.5 billion. See Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 
2015 S.C.C. 42 at para 6, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69. Since the judgment was issued in 2011, 
the plaintiffs seek to have the judgment recognized and enforced in foreign courts, 
including in the U.S. and in Canada. See Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 376 F. Supp. 2d 
334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). While the U.S. refused to recognize the judgment on the basis of 
fraud, Canada’s Supreme Court recently found jurisdiction to hear the case, allowing 
the plaintiffs to once again seek recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian 
judgment. See Nicola Hong & Kim Mackrael, Canada’s Top Court Rules in Favor of 
Ecuador Villagers in Chevron Case, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/canadas-top-court-rules-in-favor-of-ecuador-villagers-in-
chevron-case-1441384265. 
164. GAGE, supra note 124, at 17–18 (outlining the more relaxed approaches to 
personal jurisdiction found in other commonwealth countries, including the UK, 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada). For information on how Australia addresses 
personal jurisdiction in a more flexible manner, see Dickinson, supra note 124. 
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the laws that could be applied, and countries where a 
judgement could be recognized. 
As Section V of this Article illustrates, transnational 
litigation and, in particular, the possibility of the enforcement 
of climate damages judgments in U.S. courts, could have 
severe financial consequences for large U.S. greenhouse gas 
producers.165 However, first, it is necessary to consider the 
possibility that governments—either in the U.S. or abroad— 
will introduce legislation facilitating climate damages 
litigation. 
IV. CLIMATE COMPENSATION LEGISLATION 
To date, most attempts to assess the potential for climate 
damages litigation have also assumed that liability will be 
determined on the basis of current legal frameworks related to 
liability, whether common law or statutory in nature.166 
However, as this Section shows, governments often alter the 
rules related to liability in response to new developments or 
situations of perceived unfairness. 
Many countries that are suffering from climate-related 
impacts arguably have significant financial incentives for 
reform that will only grow as these impacts, especially on 
public expenditure, worsen.167 As public debate increasingly 
focuses on damages and responsibility, public opinion may also 
demand new climate compensation legislation to impose 
liability on those responsible for large-scale greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
A. Tobacco Damages Recovery Legislation and Other Laws 
As noted above, links are often made between climate 
damages litigation and tobacco damages litigation. Such 
commentary generally emphasizes the ways in which common 
law rules related to civil liability for tobacco have evolved. In 
some jurisdictions, the introduction of legislation altering 
                                               
165. See infra Section V, “Quantifying the Liability Risk of U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Producers.” 
166. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9; Zasloff, supra note 9; Penalver, supra note 9; 
PEEL, supra note 30. 
167. LYNDA COLLINS & HEATHER MCLEOD-KILMURRAY, THE CANADIAN LAW OF 
TOXIC TORTS 291 (2014). 
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common law bases for liability around tobacco claims was 
central in clarifying or establishing the rules for civil liability 
and clarifying approaches to causation.168 
Notably, in 1995, Florida enacted the Medicaid Third Party 
Liability Act,169 with British Columbia following suit in 1997, 
and other Canadian provinces following suit shortly 
thereafter.170 As Jacob Shelley explained, the Medicaid Act al-
lowed the government to recover smoking-related costs covered 
by Medicaid, and changed the rules for liability in lawsuits 
against tobacco companies: 
The Medicaid Third Party Liability Act represented a 
significant development as it allowed the state to 
introduce epidemiological evidence to prove causation, 
created a new cause of action, removed affirmative 
defences, and permitted the allocation of responsibility 
on the basis of market share.171 
Climate damages litigation appears ripe for this type of 
development. Just as the tobacco compensation acts were 
enacted in response to mounting scientific consensus that 
tobacco was a cause of cancer172 and the increasing burden of 
tobacco-related costs, the scientific consensus regarding 
climate change is improving,173 costs are increasing,174 and 
                                               
168. See Martin Olszynski et al., From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from 
Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change Liability, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (April 24, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957921 (discussing the parallels between climate 
and tobacco litigation, including the potential for climate compensation legislation 
modeled on tobacco legislation). 
169. Medicaid Third Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1995). 
170. Jacob J. Shelley, The Crown’s Right of Recovery Act, 18 HEALTH L. REV. 15, 16 
(2010). 
171. Id. at 17. 
172. Notably, while the Surgeon General determined that tobacco was a cause of 
cancer, they never stated that it was the cause of cancer. See Bruce A. Levin, The 
Liability of Tobacco Companies—Should Their Ashes be Kicked?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 195, 
223 (1987). 
173. See Oreskes, supra note 7 (finding that of 928 article abstracts listed in the 
Institute of Scientific Information database in 2004, 75 percent of the papers either 
explicitly or implicitly accepted the consensus view of the IPCC Reports, and 25 
percent took no position on the current anthropogenic climate change. Notably, none of 
the papers opposed the consensus view). 
174. See, e.g., Angela Lianovich, Comment, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit 
Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation is Feasible, 35 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 429, 431 (2005) (“Likewise, the petro industry has managed to 
pass billions of dollars in environmental costs to the public, while successfully avoiding 
common-law tort liability”). 
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attention is shifting to who should be held responsible for the 
resulting damages.175 As Lynda Collins and Heather McLeod-
Kilmurray write, 
Tobacco cost recovery statutes were enacted in response 
to the enormous expenses caused by tobacco-related 
illness. At a certain point governments (and 
presumably citizens) realized that it was inappropriate 
for the public purse to bear the burden of illnesses 
caused by profit-centered commercial enterprise. It 
seems highly likely that a similar thought process will 
occur in the climate change context. As expenses 
resulting from climate change mount (e.g. loss of roads 
and buildings due to melting permafrost in the north, 
flooding and other extreme weather events, personal 
injury from heat waves, etc.), governments may well 
feel the inclination – or indeed the necessity – to compel 
large emitters to provide compensation. Although the 
public nuisance model is theoretically available without 
statutory reform, there is no doubt that the creation of 
a statutory tort along the lines of the tobacco legislation 
would substantially increase governments’ chances of 
success in climate-related tort litigation.176 
While the possible parallels between tobacco-related 
litigation and climate damages litigation are well discussed, 
tobacco damages recovery statutes are only one of many 
examples of legislation that modifies the rules for liability. The 
ability of the legislative branch to create, clarify, modify, or 
limit rules of liability is well recognized, both in the United 
States and in countries around the world. 
In the environmental context, the rules for contaminated 
sites liability defined by the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA, 
also known as the Superfund) is an example. Section 107 of 
CERCLA makes most current and past owners (broadly 
defined) of contaminated property liable to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency for the costs of clean up, as 
well as defines possible defenses and limits on that liability.177 
                                               
175. See id., for a more complete discussion of some of the notable parallels between 
the development of tobacco legislation, leading ultimately to recovery, and the current 
state of climate litigation broadly. 
176. COLLINS, supra note 167, at 291. 
177. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012). 
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Similarly, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 imposes strict liability 
on parties that are “responsible” for oil spills, but also caps 
that liability.178 
Outside of environmental law, federal and state rules 
governing questions that are fundamental to civil litigation 
and procedure are often statutory in origin—for example, 
legislation on limitation periods, joint and several liability, and 
corporate structures. A host of other statutes also create, 
modify, or limit rules of civil liability.  Outside the United 
States, there are many precedents for statutes that modify 
civil liability rules. In civil law countries, liability regimes are 
entirely statutory in nature.179 In common law countries, 
legislation often alters the judge-made rules around liability, 
causation, and the calculation of damages.180 
Far from being remarkable or unusual, the legislative 
branch has always played a crucial role in establishing rules of 
liability in most, if not all, countries. Statutes related to 
climate damages litigation could follow the path of 
contaminated sites, oil spills, tobacco recovery, and other 
similar statutes intended to clarify rules of liability while 
addressing issues of broader public importance. Like 
transnational litigation, development of such legislation could 
lead to greenhouse gas producers being held liable for climate 
change-related damages. 
B. What Might a Climate Compensation Act Look Like? 
There is a lesson from the statutes explored in Section IV.A., 
for countries suffering climate impacts: if climate liability is 
difficult or impossible to litigate under the current legal 
                                               
178. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2012). 
179. Civil law countries include much of continental Europe and their former 
colonies, where governments have enacted “civil codes” outlining the rules governing 
liability. In Germany, there are specific statutes outlining environmental liability 
rules. See Umwelthaftungsgesetz [UmweltHG] [Environmental Liability Act], Dec. 10, 
1990, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] at 2634, § 1 (Ger.), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.ph
p?id=1396. 
180. For example, and discussed above, Canadian provinces have introduced 
legislation altering the rules around liability for the harm caused by tobacco. In 
British Columbia, see Tobacco Damages Recovery Act, S.B.C. 1997, c. 41 (Can.), 
subsequently renamed the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 
S.B.C. 2000, c. 30 (Can.). 
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system, then change the law.181 Such legislation could vary 
considerably from country to country, based on the underlying 
approaches to liability. The following list, which includes some 
of the goals a climate compensation act might accomplish, is 
based on the ways that legislation has altered and clarified 
liability in the past:182 
 clarify who can sue for climate damages, and on what 
basis (standing);183 
 recognize or create legal rights or duties in respect of 
the global atmosphere, or other rights that might 
form alternative basis of liability;184 
 clarify the type of evidence that may be used to 
establish a causal link between particular weather 
events and climate change;185 
 adapt common law causes of action, or create new 
causes of action, to address climate-related liability;186 
 address questions about limitation periods and how 
they apply to greenhouse gases emitted over long 
periods of time;187 
                                               
181. See, e.g., Tyson Dyck, Features: A Civil Action, HAZMAT MANAGEMENT (Jun. 1, 
2006), http://www.hazmatmag.com/features/a-civil-action/ (discussing how the 
reasoning in the 2005 Supreme Court of Canada decision in British Columbia v. 
Imperial Tobacco could help governments recover the public costs associated with 
other industries, particularly those with high GHG emissions). 
182. It is important to note that climate compensation acts could also have the 
reverse effect of preventing governmental and non-governmental petitioners from 
bringing claims against greenhouse gas producers. For example, legislation could be 
enacted which prevents claims against greenhouse gas producers, providing they abide 
by emission regulations. 
183. See, e.g., Environmental Bill of Rights, S.O. 1993, c. 28 § 103 (Can.); Abatement 
of Environmental Nuisances (Civil Action) Act, 5752–1992, p. 2 (Isr.) [hereinafter 
AENCAA], as discussed in Lord, supra note 16, at 294. The AENCAA allows any 
person (or NGO acting on behalf of a person) to take a civil action or class action in 
cases of environmental pollution or nuisance. 
184. See, e.g., National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 28 (S. Afr.) 
(creating a duty of care to prevent or remediate pollution). 
185. See, e.g., Medicaid Third Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 
1995). A fairly common form of legislation dealing with issues of proof is a “reverse 
onus clause,” which requires a defendant to disprove elements of a case once certain 
elements are proven. See, e.g., Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-8 § 193 (Can.). 
186. AENCAA, supra note 183, as discussed in Lord, supra note 16, at 294. There 
are statutes that create or recognize legal rights and associated causes of action in 
respect to environmental problems. See, e.g., UmweltHG, supra note 179 at 2634, § 1 
(Ger.). This Act is discussed in Lord, supra note 16, at 413. 
187. In general, limits on when court cases can be brought are statutory in nature. 
However, there are also examples of these statutes being adjusted in situations where 
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 define the remedies that a court might grant in a 
climate litigation case, including how damages might 
be apportioned between defendants;188 
 provide for reciprocal enforcement of climate-related 
judgments from countries that have similar climate 
compensation legislation.189 
In 2015, the Vanuatu Environmental Law Association and 
West Coast Environmental Law released a report outlining 
what a climate compensation act might look like.190 The report 
provides a model act with commentary, setting out a legal 
basis for common law claims by a variety of actors, including 
individuals, against major greenhouse gas emitting 
companies.191 
C. The Potential for Climate Compensation Acts 
While there are no examples to date of a comprehensive 
legal scheme aimed at addressing climate change liability, 
there is current and proposed legislation that addresses the 
civil liability of private corporations for climate change-related 
losses. 
Israel’s environmental laws include an early example of a 
statutory regime that directly addresses civil liability and 
injunctive relief related to climate change. Since 2008, these 
laws have allowed a person who may be injured by “material 
whose presence in the air causes or may cause . . . climate or 
weather change” to apply to a court for an injunction.192 Two 
more recent examples—originating in California and Kenya—
                                               
the time-delay is significant. See, e.g., Acts Amendment (Asbestos Related Diseases) 
1983, (WA) s 4 (Austl.), amending Limitations Act 1935–1978 (WA) s 38 (Austl.). 
188. See, e.g., Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 §§ 39–40 
(Can.). 
189. Some countries or jurisdictions have legislation setting out rules for the 
enforcement of court orders from other countries, including designating the orders of 
particular jurisdictions as generally enforceable. See, e.g., Foreign Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, 23 Geo. 5 c. 13 (Eng.). 
190. GAGE, supra note 124. 
191. GAGE, supra note 124. 
192. I. Rosen-Zvi, Israel, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 16, at 294 
(describing the effect of the Abatement of Environmental Nuisances (Civil Action) Act 
and the Abatement of Environmental Nuisances Act, 1961 as amended by the Clean 
Air Act, 2008). Id. at 294 (suggesting that claims for damages related to such an 
injunction might be brought under the Class Action Act). 
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suggest a new interest in legislation aimed at holding large-
scale industrial actors accountable for their contributions to 
climate change.193 
Starting in the United States, the Climate Science Truth 
and Accountability Act is, at the time of writing, being debated 
in the California Senate. The Climate Science Truth and 
Accountability Act arises out of revelations that Exxon and 
other fossil fuel companies knew, possibly as early as the 
1960s, that fossil fuels were disrupting the global atmosphere, 
and yet the companies spread and funded misinformation 
campaigns, apparently to stifle public action on climate 
change. As a result of these revelations, several state attorneys 
generals have launched investigations into Exxon, with 
consideration of possible proceedings under anti-trust laws. In 
California, the Climate Science Truth and Accountability Act 
amends the state’s limitation laws to prevent a fossil fuel giant 
from claiming that any such proceedings are statute barred. 
While not aimed at compensation for climate damages, the Act 
represents a precedent for amending legislation to hold fossil 
fuel companies accountable for climate-related activities that 
are now viewed as tortious. 
Kenya’s Climate Change Act (2014) is a comprehensive 
climate change statute, which became law in May 2016.194 
Section 23 of the Act includes an important provision setting 
out rules for civil liability and compensation for actions related 
to climate change: 
(1)  A person may, pursuant to Article 70 of the 
Constitution, apply to the Environment and Land 
Court alleging that a person has acted in a manner 
that has or is likely to adversely affect efforts 
towards mitigation and adaptation to the effects of 
                                               
193. Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act of 2014 is not included in this 
list because it tackles regional transnational impacts of air pollution; however, it still 
represents an important recent example of national liability rules being modified to 
address transnational pollution impacts. Transboundary Haze Pollution Act (Act No. 
24/2014) (Sing.). The Act creates a duty of entities to avoid contributing to the “haze 
pollution in Singapore,” and makes a breach of that duty “actionable conduct at the 
suit of any person in Singapore” who has suffered personal injury, property loss, or 
economic loss as a result of the breach. Id. § 6. The Act also creates various 
presumptions that would assist the plaintiff in such litigation. Id. § 8. 
194. David Njagi, At Last, Kenya Signs Bill Into Climate Change, PAN-AFRICAN 
MEDIA ALLIANCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (May 6, 2016), 
http://pamaccafrica.blogspot.ca/2016/05/finally-kenya-hassigns-bill-into.html. 
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climate change. 
(2)  Where an application is made under sub-section (1), 
the Court may make an order or give directions that 
it considers appropriate to— 
(a) prevent, stop or discontinue an act or omission that 
is harmful to the environment; 
(b) compel a public officer to take measures to prevent 
or discontinue an act or omission that is harmful to 
the environment; or 
(c) provide compensation to a victim of a violation 
relating to climate change duties. 
(3)  For the purposes of this section, an applicant does 
not have to demonstrate that a person has incurred 
loss or suffered injury.195 
The Kenyan Climate Change Act represents the best 
example of a statute addressing climate compensation since 
the amendments to Israeli rules for injunctive relief in 2008. It 
is worth noting that Kenya, even prior to this new law, had 
been identified by Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide as a 
jurisdiction in which there were legal bases for climate 
damages claims.196 Also, Kenya’s new Act is reportedly the first 
climate change law enacted in an African country,197 
suggesting that the Act could be used by other African 
countries as a model. 
A joint agreement, “People’s Declaration for Climate 
Justice,” signed by six island nations in 2015, expresses the 
desire of countries suffering from climate change to hold 
accountable those seen as responsible for climate damages. 
This agreement includes a sentiment that may give rise to 
climate compensation statutes in the coming years: 
We are from island states in shared oceans. We stand in 
solidarity. 
We commit to holding those most responsible for 
climate change accountable. By doing so, we send a 
message of hope that the people and not the polluters 
are in charge of humanity’s destiny. 
We commit to bring a case that would investigate the 
                                               
195. Climate Change Act, No. 11 (2016) THE LAWS OF KENYA, Part IV § 23 (Kenya), 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex//actview.xql?actid=No.%2011%20of%202016. 
196. ENVTL. LAW ALL. WORLDWIDE, supra note 138. 
197. Njagi, supra note 194. 
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human rights implications of climate change and hold 
the big carbon polluters accountable to appropriate 
international bodies or processes.198 
If enacted, climate compensation legislation would have the 
potential to significantly impact litigation among domestic 
parties within the enacting states, as well as the potential to 
significantly impact transnational litigation. In the context of 
transnational litigation, foreign climate compensation acts 
might be applied in—and greatly facilitate—cases brought in a 
foreign court involving a foreign plaintiff and a U.S. 
greenhouse gas producer. The plaintiff could then seek to have 
any resulting judgment recognized and enforced in the United 
States or any other country where the defendant has assets. As 
is discussed in Section V, these potential outcomes could have 
significant implications for U.S. greenhouse gas producers. 
V. QUANTIFYING THE LIABILITY RISK OF U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCERS 
Should one or both of the potentialities regarding 
transnational litigation and legislation alter the rules around 
litigation and liability, the liability of U.S. greenhouse gas 
producers could be staggering. For the sake of illustration, this 
Section draws upon research by Richard Heede, quantifying 
the contribution of ninety entities to historic greenhouse gas 
emissions, and considers the potential liability of five oil, gas, 
and coal companies currently trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange: Chevron, ExxonMobil, Conoco Phillips, Peabody 
Energy, and Consol Energy.199 
A. Methodology 
Heede’s study quantifies the relative contribution of major 
fossil fuel companies to global greenhouse gas emissions and 
provides a starting point for estimating the potential liability 
of U.S. companies for the costs and damages of climate change, 
                                               
198. People’s Declaration for Climate Justice, GREENPEACE (June 8, 2015) (Phil.), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/climate/2015/P
eople%E2%80%99s%20Declaration%20for%20Climate%20Justice.pdf. 
199. Fossil fuel producers, such as these companies, are attractive targets for 
climate change lawsuits as they are “upstream defendants”: companies responsible not 
only for their own emissions, but also for the emissions resulting from the proper use 
of their products. See Zasloff, supra note 9, at 1861–63. 
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both globally and in specific countries.200 Heede’s figures 
include estimates of both direct emissions (those created by the 
company and its subsidiaries) and “downstream” emissions 
(those produced by the oil, gas or coal when it is burned).201 
The aforementioned U.S. oil, gas, and coal companies 
represent the top five U.S. greenhouse gas producing 
companies on Heede’s list of “carbon majors” (and all five are 
among the top ten investor-owned greenhouse gas producers 
worldwide).202 
To reach the liability figures below, each U.S. company’s 
percentage of global emissions from 1751 to 2010 was 
multiplied by the costs and damages of climate change as 
provided in the 2012 Climate Vulnerability Forum/DARA 
Report (DARA Report) funded by UNICEF, among others.203 
This report focuses on the socio-economic impact of global 
emissions on individual nations, differentiating between the 
costs and damages caused by climate change204 and the direct 
                                               
200. Heede, supra note 86, at 229. See Richard Heede, Supplementary Materials: 
Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and 
Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 6–9, 
http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/Heede%20SupplementaryMaterials%20Nov1
3.pdf. The Supplementary Materials to Heede’s study divide the carbon majors into 
investor-owned companies, state-owned companies, and nation states. As this Article 
focuses on the potential liability of greenhouse gas producing companies, it 
concentrates on Heede’s list of investor-owned “carbon majors,” which together 
represent 21.7 percent of global emissions from 1751 to 2010. As examined in this 
Section, the top five US greenhouse gas producing companies all fall within Heede’s 
top ten investor-owned carbon majors and cumulatively represent 9.4 percent of global 
emissions from 1751 to 2010. Id. 
201. This raises questions about the relative legal responsibility of companies that 
extract, process, and market fossil fuels relative to the end-user. However, case law 
concerning MTBE fuel additives, tobacco, and other products demonstrates that courts 
can and will find manufacturers of products that cause harm liable for the anticipated 
use of their products. See e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. 
Fla. 2000); Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). 
202. Heede, supra note 86. “Carbon majors” refer to the ninety entities responsible 
for 63 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions to date. These U.S. companies are 
typical of others on Heede’s list of carbon majors in that their greenhouse gas 
production began early in the 1900s, well before the impact of greenhouse gases on 
climate change became well-established. This could suggest that the U.S. companies’ 
respective share of global emissions from 1990 to present—and consequent liability—
may be slightly lower than identified in Heede’s study. 
203. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3. 
204. The estimate for “climate change” encompasses the costs and damages asso-
ciated with a global rise in temperature. Examples of the types of costs and damages of 
climate change considered in the DARA Report include, but are not limited to: hunger; 
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costs caused by the current “carbon economy.”205 
The liability figures do not include the costs and damages 
caused by U.S. companies’ contribution to the carbon economy 
because these effects are largely localized. That is, unlike 
climate impacts, where a U.S. contribution is proportionately 
responsible for damage in other countries, the bulk of costs and 
damages caused by U.S. companies through the carbon 
economy will be borne in and by the United States.206 
B. Global Liability of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Producers 
The DARA Report estimates the total costs and damages of 
climate change and the carbon economy in 2010 as $1.2 
trillion, or 1.7 percent of global GDP, rising to 3.2 percent of 
global GDP by 2030.207 Using the information provided in the 
report, the total annual costs and damages of climate change 
alone in 2010 were nearly $700 billion.208 The figures in Table 
1 below represent the annual contribution of the top five U.S. 
greenhouse gas emitting producers to the global costs and 
                                               
melting permafrost; drought, floods and landslides; loss of biodiversity and rising sea 
levels; malaria and other vector borne diseases; and stresses on fishing, forestry, 
tourism, and other industries. See CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 
3, at 63. 
205. The estimate for the “carbon economy” focuses on the localized costs and 
damages arising from the production and use of fossil fuels. The DARA Report 
considers examples of the types of costs and damages of the carbon economy, including 
but not limited to: costs and damages caused by oil extraction and oil spills, increased 
risk of health issues associated with air pollution, and stresses on industries. See id. 
206. Excluding the costs and damages of the carbon economy may result in 
conservative liability estimates, as they include only one aspect of the damages and 
costs caused by the U.S. companies. 
207. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 17. 
208. See CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 17. While the 
Executive Summary does not provide a number for global GDP in 2010, it is possible to 
estimate the global GDP as $70.6 trillion using the numbers provided (where 1.7 
percent of global GDP is $1.2 trillion, global GDP is $1.2 trillion divided by 1.7 percent 
or 0.017). Id. Accordingly, it is possible to estimate the 2010 costs and damages of 
climate change alone (i.e. excluding costs from the carbon economy) as $705.8 billion 
(where the costs and damages of climate change are an estimated 1.0 percent of GDP, 
climate change costs and damages is global GDP multiplied by 0.01). Id. This estimate 
of $705.8 billion is higher than the estimate of $609.0 billion, reached by totaling the 
individual costs and damages of each climate vulnerability indicator. Id. at 23. Note 
also that the original global GDP in 2010 estimate of $70.6 trillion, derived from the 
numbers presented in the Executive Summary, is greater than the global GDP 2010 
estimate by the World Bank of $63.0 trillion. World Development Indicators Database, 
Gross Domestic Product 2010, WORLD BANK 4 (Jul. 1, 2011), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf. 
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damages of climate change alone in 2010 and by 2030.209 
 
Table 1210 
 
GLOBAL LIABILITY OF U.S. COMPANIES 
Entity Percentage 
of Global 
Emissions 
1751–2010 
Market 
Capitalization 
(2010 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars)211 
Annual 
contribution to 
the costs and 
damages of 
climate change 
(2010 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars) 
Annual 
contribution to 
the costs and 
damages of 
climate change 
(2030 in 2010 U.S. 
Dollars) 
Chevron 3.52% $183.6 billion $21.4 billion $151.5 billion 
Exxon 
Mobil 
3.22% $368.7 billion $19.6 billion $138.6 billion 
Conoco 
Phillips 
1.16% $100.1 billion $7.1 billion $49.9 billion 
Peabody 
Energy 
0.86% - $5.2 billion $37.0 billion 
Consol 
Energy 
0.63% - $3.8 billion $27.1 billion 
C. Liability of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Producers in Developing 
Countries 
While the global liability of U.S. companies is significant, 
recovery for the costs and damages of climate change through 
litigation or legislation will develop in individual countries—
likely by those expected to suffer most from the impacts of 
climate change, but receive little benefit from fossil fuels. 
Vietnam, Ghana, and India fall into this category, as they are 
                                               
209. I.e., excluding costs from the carbon economy. Each company’s “Percentage of 
Global Emissions 1751–2010” is taken from Heede, supra note 86, at 229. 
210.  See Section V.A., “Methodology” (describing the methodology used to reach 
these calculations). 
 211. Note that the market capitalization of each company in 2010 is included to 
illustrate how significant liability is relative to capitalization. The liability estimates 
relative to capitalization would conceivably be even greater if growth of these 
companies were to slow, as it becomes clear that some of the proven reserves of the 
companies cannot be gainfully exploited. 
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historically considered to be “low emitters” in “acute” or 
“severe” danger of significant losses from climate change.212 
The figures in Table 2 below represent the contribution of the 
top five U.S. greenhouse gas producers to the costs and 
damages of climate change in these developing countries.213 
1. Vietnam 
The DARA Report estimates the net costs and damages 
caused by climate change in Vietnam in 2010 as approximately 
$14.2 billion,214 rising to $160.6 billion by 2030.215 As Table 2 
illustrates, the top five U.S. greenhouse gas producers 
contributed approximately $1.3 billion to these costs and 
damages in 2010, and are expected to contribute $15.1 billion 
per year by 2030. 
2. Ghana 
The DARA Report estimates the net costs and damages 
caused by climate change in Ghana in 2010 as approximately 
$2.7 billion,216 rising to $20.5 billion by 2030.217 As indicated in 
                                               
212. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 294–96. 
213. While the DARA Report estimates the costs of climate change for each country 
in terms of a percentage of GDP, it does not provide a dollar value of the losses in one 
location. For the purposes of this report, country specific net costs are calculated by 
totaling the costs for the country for each indicator assessed by the DARA Report. 
Provided in the following footnotes are comparisons of the numbers achieved by 
totaling the costs for the country for each indicator, and the numbers reached by 
multiplying the costs of climate change as a percentage of GDP by actual GDP in 2010 
and projected GDP in 2030. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 
294–96. 
214. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation). 
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Vietnam are estimated as 
5.2 percent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2010. Id. at 296. The GDP for Vietnam in 2010 is 
estimated as $280 billion 2010 PPP (purchasing power parity is an economic concept 
used to determine the relative value of currency across countries). Id. at 219. Using 
these numbers, the estimated costs and damages of climate change were $14.6 billion 
in 2010 (which is slightly more than achieved by adding the various DARA Report 
indicators for Vietnam). 
215. According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Vietnam are 
estimated as 10.7 percent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2030.  CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & 
DARA, supra note 3, at 296. The GDP for Vietnam in 2030 is estimated as $1.5 trillion 
2030 PPP. Id. at 219. Using these numbers, the estimated costs and damages of 
climate change would be $160.5 billion in 2030 (which is significantly more than that 
achieved by adding the various DARA Report indicators for Vietnam). 
216. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation). 
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Ghana are estimated as 4.4 
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Table 2, the contribution of the top five U.S. greenhouse gas 
producers to the costs and damages of climate change totaled 
$255.5 million in 2010, with this number projected to increase 
to $1.9 billion per year by 2030. 
3. India 
It is particularly relevant to examine the contribution of 
U.S. companies to the costs and damages of climate change in 
India, given the nation’s potentially favorable judicial 
environment for climate change litigation.218 The DARA Report 
estimates the net costs and damages caused by climate change 
in India in 2010 as approximately $76.5 billion,219 rising to 
$613.6 billion by 2030.220 As shown in Table 2, the top five U.S. 
greenhouse gas producers contributed approximately $7.2 
billion to these costs and damages in 2010, and are expected to 
contribute $57.6 billion per year by 2030. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
percent of Ghana’s GDP in 2010. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, 
at 296. The GDP for Ghana in 2010 is estimated as $65 billion 2010 PPP. Id. at 207. 
Using these numbers, the estimated costs and damages of climate change were $2.7 
billion in 2010 (which matches the estimated loss achieved by adding the various 
climate vulnerability monitor indicators for Ghana). 
217. Supra note 3, at 58 n. 212 (discussing the formula for this calculation). 
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Ghana are estimated as 8.9 
percent of Ghana’s GDP in 2030. Id. at 296. The GDP for Ghana in 2030 is estimated 
as $210 billion 2030 PPP. Id. at 207. Using these numbers, the estimated costs and 
damages of climate change would be $18.7 billion in 2030 (which is slightly higher 
than that achieved by adding the various climate vulnerability monitor indicators for 
Ghana). 
218. Some have singled out India as being a promising venue for climate damages 
litigation due to the “potentially potent combination of the following: (i) well developed 
law and activist judiciary; (ii) its status as a potentially serious ‘victim’ of climate 
change; and (iii) at the same time its large population, economic power and growth 
rate, and status as a ‘top ten’ (in cumulative terms) GHG emitter.” See CLIMATE 
CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 16, at 48. 
219. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation). 
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for India are estimated as 2.2 
percent of India’s GDP in 2010. Id. at 294. The DARA Report does not provide an 
estimated GDP for India in 2010. 
220. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation). 
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for India are estimated as 4.3 
percent of India’s GDP in 2030. Id. at 294. The DARA Report does not provide a 
projected GDP for India in 2030. 
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Table 2 
 
LIABILITY OF U.S. COMPANIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
VIETNAM 
Entity Percentage of 
Global 
Emissions 
1751–2010 
Annual contribution 
to the costs and 
damages of climate 
change (2010 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars) 
Annual contribution 
to the costs and 
damages of climate 
change (2030 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars) 
Chevron 3.52% $501.5 million $5.7 billion 
Exxon Mobil 3.22% $458.7 million $5.2 billion 
Conoco 
Phillips 
1.16% $165.3 million $1.9 billion 
Peabody 
Energy 
0.86% $122.5 million $1.4 billion  
Consol 
Energy 
0.63% $89.7 million $1.0 billion  
GHANA 
Entity Percentage of 
Global 
Emissions 
1751–2010 
Annual contribution 
to the costs and 
damages of climate 
change (2010 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars) 
Annual contribution 
to the costs and 
damages of climate 
change (2030 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars) 
Chevron 3.52% $95.8 million $720.0 million 
Exxon Mobil 3.22% $87.6 million $658.7 million 
Conoco 
Phillips 
1.16% $31.6 million $237.3 million 
Peabody 
Energy 
0.86% $23.4 million $175.9 million 
Consol 
Energy 
0.63% $17.1 million  $128.9 million 
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INDIA  
Entity Percentage of 
Global 
Emissions 
1751–2010 
Annual contribution 
to the costs and 
damages of climate 
change (2010 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars) 
Annual contribution 
to the costs and 
damages of climate 
change (2030 in 2010 
U.S. Dollars) 
Chevron 3.52% $2.7 billion $21.6 billion 
Exxon Mobil 3.22% $2.5 billion $19.8 billion 
Conoco 
Phillips 
1.16% $887.1 million $7.1 billion 
Peabody 
Energy 
0.86% $657.6 million $5.3 billion  
Consol 
Energy 
0.63% $481.8 million $3.9 billion  
 
These figures represent the total contribution of U.S. 
companies to climate change damages, globally and in specific 
countries, and therefore the risk, not certainty, of liability; the 
actual numbers could be lower or, conceivably, higher. 
Even if courts around the world become increasingly willing 
to award climate damages against fossil fuel companies, there 
may be situations that prevent full recovery.221 The only way 
that awards based purely on damages could even approach 
these estimates would be if it became commonplace for govern-
ments to bring suits for all climate damages suffered by their 
citizens and their country (encompassing a wide range of the 
climate damages).222 
                                               
221. For example, if the link between a company’s greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate damages cannot be proven on the basis of a balance of probabilities, or where a 
plaintiff is not in a position to engage in large-scale tort litigation, then there may not 
be (full) recovery. 
222. This type of litigation, known as parens patriae litigation, in which the 
government acts in the role of a parent on behalf of the public, is well established in 
the United States. See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 
497, 518–28 (2007) (recognizing the ability of states as parens patriae to protect 
natural resources or the health of citizens). The emergence of class actions for climate 
damages might also represent a significant percentage of the damages discussed, but 
would probably not include environmental and other public damages which could be 
better captured in a parens patriae case. 
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On the other hand, the calculations above do not reflect the 
possibility of punitive awards, which is in addition to damages 
for actual harm suffered, and intended to punish egregious 
behavior.  Such awards might be possible where companies 
make little effort to move away from fossil fuels despite full 
knowledge of the damage they cause, or where companies 
actively undercut science establishing the connection between 
emissions and climate change.223 
Subject to these qualifications, this Article is a first attempt 
at quantifying the considerable liabilities that at least five U.S. 
companies might be incurring. Investors may wish to note that 
the current stock valuations of Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Conoco 
Phillips, Peabody Energy, and Consol Energy Inc., as well as 
other companies responsible for high levels of greenhouse gas 
production, do not take into account this risk of climate 
damages litigation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article opened with a quotation by Bank of England 
Governor Mark Carney, describing climate change as a 
“Tragedy of the Horizon” that is bound to become a “defining 
issue for [global] financial stability” in the coming decades.224 
While Carney identifies multiple channels through which 
climate change will impact financial stability, the focus of this 
Article has been the second: the liability risks presented by 
climate damages litigation. 
Two previously overlooked potentialities—the emergence of 
                                               
223. The Guardian recently reported that ExxonMobil was aware of the connection 
between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change as early as 1981. See Suzanne 
Goldenberg, Exxon Knew of Climate Change in 1981, Email Says – but it Funded 
Deniers for 27 More Years, THE GUARDIAN, (Jul. 8, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/08/exxon-climate-change-1981-
climate-denier-funding. According to Greenpeace, ExxonMobil has since spent over $30 
million on think-tanks and research promoting climate change denial. Id. In Canada, a 
Quebec superior court recently ordered three major cigarette companies to pay $15 
billion to smokers, with the plaintiffs arguing that the companies were aware of the 
health concerns and profited from the addictive quality of cigarettes. See Létourneau 
v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2015 QCCS 2382, 10 J.E. 2015-1024 (Can.). For a discussion 
of the parallels between potential legislation altering the liability rules around climate 
change and those around tobacco legislation in Canada (such as those found in 
Quebec), see GAGE, supra note 124 and see GAGE & BYERS, supra note 138 at 34–37. 
Note also that the figures do not reflect the considerable legal costs that would be 
incurred by companies defending themselves against such lawsuits. 
224. Carney, supra note 1, at 1. 
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transnational climate damages litigation, including the 
possible enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. courts; and 
the enactment of climate compensation legislation—have the 
ability to shift the current climate damages litigation 
landscape well within the decades forecasted by Carney. 
Section V of this Article calculates the substantial “climate 
liabilities” held by the top five U.S. greenhouse gas producers, 
if and when parties who have suffered climate damages 
succeed in recovering compensation. The liability of the top 
global greenhouse gas producers would be staggering, with far 
reaching consequences for their corporate survival. Investors 
will wish to inform themselves of these risks; money managers, 
for their part, have a legal duty to do so.225 
 
                                               
225. See Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the 
Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate 
Change, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. & STAN. J. INT’L L. 251, 271 (2007) (“Failing to take 
into account climate change through fund risk management practices could be deemed 
a breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, if the investment goals of the pension plan (or 
foundation or charitable trust) include environmental health or sustainability criteria, 
the fiduciaries must make certain that their investment-related decisions further 
environmental health or sustainability”). 
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